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THE ECONOMIC TREATMENT OF
AUTOMOBILE INJURIES
Alfred F. Conard*
I.

T

INTRODUCTION

HE automobile has

changed more than Americans' ways of transportation. It has changed their ways of housing, of working and
playing, of eating, living, and loving. It has also added to their ways
of suffering and dying.
The suffering and dying have called forth two kinds of treatment.
The better recognized kind is medical treatment, which staves off
death and minimizes pain and disability among the living. The less
recognized kind of treatment is economic-the restoration to the
injury victim or to his dependents of some part of the economic wellbeing that has been snatched away from them by loss of income
and by the costs of medical treatment.
Although the economic treatment has reached sizable dimensions
-probably about 2.5 billion dollars a year in the United States1until recently, little attention has been given to its scope, its functions, and its additions to or subtractions from the national welfare.
Such attention as it has attracted has been directed chiefly to aspects of
the remedy provided by tort law-the long waiting lists for jury trial,
the alleged pursuit of claimants by "ambulance-chasers," the take
of claimants' lawyers, and the failure of many motorists to insure
adequately against liability.2 Information on these topics may illumi• Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. The author acknowledges the
imaginative and efficient research assistance of Mr. J. Ethan Jacobs, an assistant editor
of the Michigan Law Review.
1. This estimate covers payments for automobile-related injuries made by liability
insurers, life and health insurers, and social security and other social insurance systems.
The amount of automobile liability insurance pay-outs in 1960 was reported as about
1.5 billion dollars. A recent survey indicates that liability insurance pay-outs amount
to about half of total loss shifting on account of automobile accidents. CONARD,
MORGAN, PRATI, VOLTZ 8: BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT Cos-rs AND PAYMENTS:
STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY REPARATION 1-19, 151 fig. 4-1, 174 fig. 5-10 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as AACP].
2. On delay, see LEVIN &: WOOLLEY, DISPATCH AND DELAY: A FIELD STUDY OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION IN PENNSYLVANIA (1961); ZEISEL, KALVIN &: BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE
COURT (1959); Rosenberg &: Sovern, Delay and the Dynamics of Personal Injury Litigation, 59 CoLUM, L. REv. Ill5 (1959); see also Zeise! &: Callahan, Split Trials and
Time Saving: A. Statistical Analysis, 76 HARv. L. REv. 1606 (1963).
For an interesting popular description of the operations of a successful ambulance
chaser, see The Saturday Evening Post, March 23, 1957, p. 19; see also DRINKER, LEGAL
ETHICS 64 (1953).
On the high cost of compensation collection, see Franklin, Chanin 8: Mark, A.cci-
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nate the work of lawyers and judges, but it throws little light on the
plight of the injury victims.
Fortunately, attention is belatedly shifting from the problems
of jurists to those of injured people. Within the past ten years, a
remarkable body of information concerning economic treatment has
emerged. For the first time since the parameters of the problem
were radically revised by the birth of the welfare state,8 observers
have the means of viewing the problem of economic treatment with
a reasonably broad grasp of its magnitude and of the spectrum of
phenomena that it includes.
The most comprehensive of the reports containing this new information is a state, national, and international study of injury
reparation produced at The University of Michigan by an interdisciplinary and international team of researchers and contributorsJ
Two other comprehensive studies of automobile injury consequences
have been produced by John F. Adams of Temple University,
based upon surveys in Philadelphia and New Jersey. 5 A more nardents, Money, and the Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation,
61 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 20-!l0 (1961); see also Bloom, When the Lawyer Gets the Spoils,
Readers Digest, March 1960, p. 105.

On failure to insure adequately against liability, see LaBrum, Time for Action:
The Problem of Motorists' Insurance, 45 A.B.A.J. 692, 691! (1959); see generally
GREGORY 8: KAI.VEN, CAsEs ON TORTS 71l!l-42 (1959). Report number 1 of the [Michigan]
Governor's Commission To Study the Problem of the Uninsured Motorist (1958)
[unbound and unpublished], indicates at note !l that, while the uninsured and
financially irresponsible motorists are about 10% of the total number of motorists,
they are involved in slightly more than 20% of the accidents.
On simulated or exaggerated claims, see Gannon, Insurance Cheats, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 28, 1964, p. 1, col. I.
·
!l. In the last year before the F. D. Roosevelt administration, a comprehensive study
of automobile accidents was published. REPORT BY THE COMMITI'EE TO STUDY CoMPEN·
SATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS (Columbia Univ. Council for Research in the
Social Sciences, 1932) (hereinafter cited as THE COLUMBIA REPORT]. Much of the information it contains has dubious application today because of the subsequent rise of the
social security system and other devices for providing aid to the injured.
4. AACP. The central feature of this report is a survey of automobile injury victims
throughout the state of Michigan, indicating the kinds and extent of their economic
losses and the reparation that they reap from tort law, from private life and health insurance, from social security, from poor relief, and from other sources. The survey includes
significant information on the causes of dispute, the delay in collecting reparation, and
the personal opinions and reactions of lawyers and their clients. Another section of the
study compares the national volume costs of reparation through the tort law system
with those of reparation by way of private loss insurance, social security, and other
regimes; this section also contains analyses of the social objectives and achievements of
the various systems. In a third section of the study, four foreign contributors explain
how similar problems are handled in England, France, Germany, and Sweden.
5. Adams, A Survey of the Economic-Financial Consequences of Personal Injuries
Resulting from Automobile Accidents in the City of Philadelphia, 1953, Temple Univ.
Economics 8: Business Bull., March 1955 (hereinafter cited as Adams '55]. It is based
upon interviews with accident victims in the city of Philadelphia and produced rather
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rowly focused study, with sharply outlined conclusions on the adequacy of reparation, was made by a research team at the University
of Pennsylvania, based upon accidents occurring in 1956 in the
Philadelphia metropolitan area. 6 A wealth of information on the
attitudes and behavior of injury victims was yielded by a study of
minor injury cases in New York City. Under the title, "Who Sues
in New York?," this provocative and readable volume probed the
motivation of injury victims in deciding to sue or not to sue, as
affected by the extent of their injuries, their contributory negligence
or lack of it, their lawyer contacts, and other elements.7
In addition to these studies focused on reparation, there are a
number of important studies conducted from engineering and
medical points of view on the causes and consequences of accidents.
The highway departments of several states, with encouragement and
guidance from the Federal Bureau of Public Roads, have conducted
studies of the total "direct costs" of automobile accidents.8 Engineering studies of accident causes that consider elements of automotive
startling evidence that about 30% of the accidents were caused by uninsured automobiles, although the percentage of uninsured automobiles registered was considerably
less. It also demonstrated for the first time the frequency and significance of sources of
reparation other than tort liability. In addition, this report presented illuminating
information and trenchant comments on settlement procedures of liability insurance
companies and on the attitudes of injury victims.
Adams, A Comparative Analysis of Costs of Insuring Against Losses Due to Automobile Accidents: Various Hypotheses-New Jersey, 1955, Temple Univ. Economics &:
Business Bull., March 1960 [hereinafter cited as Adams '60]. It was based upon a statewide sample of automobile accidents in New Jersey and was undertaken in order to
estimate the increase in costs that would result from substituting a compensation system for the existing tort liability system. In the course of this survey, rather specific
estimates were made of the amounts contributed to reparation by the various regimes
at work, with the indication that tort liability furnishes less than half of the total
reparation that victims receive.
6. Morris &: Paul, The Financial Impact of Automobile Accidents, llO U. PA. L.
REv. 913 (1962). Like the Michigan and the Adams surveys, this one included reparation from loss insurance and social security as well as sums paid to discharge tort
liability.
7. Hur-mNG &: NEUWIRTH, WHO SUES IN NEW YORK CITY? (1962).
8. COST OF MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS TO ILUNOIS MOTORISTS, 1958 (Ill. Dept. of Pub.
Works and Bldgs., Div. of Highways, 1962). There is a summary of this information in
Billingsley &: Jorgenson, Analyses of Direct Costs and Frequencies of Illinois Motor-Vehicle Accidents, 1958, Public Roads, Aug. 1963, p. 201. A symposium in Public Roads,
June 1960, p. 33, entitled "Four Articles on Traffic Accident Costs" compares accident
data from Utah and Massachusetts. Similar statistics were compiled in New Mexico,
but have not been put in a form generally available to the public.
These studies are directed toward accident costs per vehicle mile on different kinds
of roads, but they supply some useful points for comparison with the reparation surveys as to the number and distribution of personal injury accidents. They also contain
some arresting indications that more money is paid for legal services than for health
services as a result of accidents and produce impressively high figures for the amount of
"awards in excess of known costs."
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design and apparatus have been published by the Cornell University
Automotive Crash Injury Research program.9 Medical studies of
fatality cases, with autopsies on automobiles and victims alike, have
been conducted at the Harvard School of Public Health10 and, more
recently, at the University of Michigan School of Medicine.11
II.

RESULTS OF THE NEW RESEARCH

The results of the new research make it possible to view injury
treatment as a problem of human suffering and deprivation, rather
than as a problem of tort theory, judicial administration, or professional ethics. To appreciate the difference, one must look back
over the products of the mental exertions of legal scholars relating
to automobile injuries in the past half century.
Through the years, foremost attention in the literature of the law
has been given to those problems that are chiefly involved in the decisions of appellate courts, which, in the Langdellian tradition, are
the prime working material of "legal science."12 On this plane, the
main subject of attack has been the principle of contributory negligence, whereby an injury victim is denied any compensation under
tort law if he has contributed to his injury by any fault of his own.
Researchers have contended that the doctrine of "comparative negligence" is more in accord with moral ideas of the community18 or
have measured the effects on procedure and insurance costs of such
a change.14
9. The results of these studies have been published as monographs on the effective•
ness of seat belts, safety window glass, padded instrument panels, and other elements.
A list may be obtained on request from the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, Inc.,
P.O. Box 235, Buffalo 21, New York; a summary of major findings is published ;n
HUMAN FACTORS IN TECHNOLOGY 230-36 (1963); O'Connell, Taming the Automobile,
5~ Nw. U.L. REv. 299, 334-56 (1963), contains an interesting discussion of the possibilities suggested by these studies for improvement in automobile safety.
10. REsEARCH ON FATAL HIGHWAY COLLISIONS, PAPERS 1961-62 (Moseley ed.); id.,
PAPERS 1962-63 (Moseley ed.). See also They're Finding 'Why' in Auto Wrecks, Journal
of American Insurance, Nov. 1963, p. I. These studies emphasize the safety potentiality
of design and apparatus, but they also indicate the presence of suicidal or homicidal
elements in far more automobile "accidents" than previously had been thought likely.
11. Gikas & Huelke, Causes of Death in Automobile Accidents: Can Seat Belts
Really Save Lives? 63 J. MICH. s. MEDICAL Soc'Y 351 (1964).
12. "First, that law is a science; secondly, that all the available materials of that
science are contained in printed books." C. C. Langdell, 1886, quoted in 2 "WARREN,
HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 374 (1908).
13. Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law Reform, 11 U. FLA. L. REv. 135 (1958); Philbrick, Loss Apportionment in Negligence Cases
(pts. 1-2), 99 U. PA. L. REv. 572, 766 (1951); Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH.
L. REv. 465 (1953); Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March (pts. 1-2), 28 CHI.KENT L. REv. 189, 304 (1950).
14. Peck, Comparative Negligence and Automobile Liability Insurance, 58 MICH. L.
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On a similar plane of inquiry, critics of the existing law have
attacked the rules affecting the rights of guests and members of the
family of the guilty driver or of the vicariously liable automobile
owner. 111 Some find it immoral that the guest should be able to sue
his host or the child his parent, while others find it just as revolting
that he should be forbidden to do so.
A more recent wave of research has stepped down from the
altitudes of legal principles, as formulated by appellate courts, to the
goings-on in the trial courts. Here a principal concern has been
delay in getting to trial, with weighty studies investigating the
length of the delays and the effectiveness of various attempts to
shorten the waiting time.16 Another subject of concern among the
trial investigators has been the medical witnesses and the startling
conflicts in their "expert testimony." 17 Significant experiments have
been launched in New York and Illinois to test the effectiveness of
substituting "impartial" expert witnesses, nominated by the court,
for the "partisan" witnesses procured by the respective antagonists
in the struggle.18
A third type of research has stepped out of the courtroom and into
the Ia·wyer's office to investigate the costs of hiring lawyers to recover
compensation for injury claimants, with or without suit.19
Valuable as these studies have been, most of them have the limitation that they focus on the business of lawyers-appeals, trials, and
client representation. The legal researcher learns all that is in them,
only to find that he still knows very little about the people who are
injured in automobile accidents and how they have been impoverished or enriched; he has no idea whether there are some other
people who do not find, or are not found by, claimants' compensation attorneys and, if so, whether the people who stay outside the
toils of lawyers and court proceedings are a small minority or the
great majority of the injury victims.
A researcher who is interested in people will necessarily demand
studies that tell him something about people who escape the law's
toils as well as about those who get into them; he will be less interREY. 689 (1960); Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A "Before and After"
Survey, 13 ARK. L. REY. 89 (1959).
15. See, e.g., Pedrick, Taken for a Ride: The Automobile Guest and Assumption of
Risk, 22 LA. L. REY. 90 (1961).
16. See authorities on delay cited in note 2 supra.
17. See, e.g., Symposium, 34 TEMPLE L. Q. 476 (1961); Comment, 55 Nw. U.L. REv.
700 (1961).
18. Ibid.
19. Franklin, Chanin, &: Mark, supra note 2.
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ested in how long trials are delayed than in how many accident
victims are never compensated at all.
If such data are demanded by a legal researcher, they must be
even more essential to an appraisal of the problem by an economist,
a sociologist, or a public-health physician. Thus, it is striking that the
impact of automobile injuries has attracted such minimal attention
from social scientists, who have poured forth their efforts on industrial injuries,20 which are less costly in the aggregate than automobile
injuries.21 The trouble seems to be that there has been no supply of
the kinds of facts about automobile injuries that would be of interest
to a social scientist. He does not care much about tort theory, and he
sees trial delay and lawyers' fees as narrow problems, of interest only
to a clique of specialists.
The.purpose of the new research is to supply data that are useful for viewing injury reparation as a community problem that is
not only legal but also social and economic. Such a view will help
to preserve or remold reparation to the advantage not only of appellate judges, trial lawyers, litigants, and law professors but also of the
common man who suffers injury and pays insurance premiums.
This research is "new" not only because it is recent; it is also
new in approach. It is not like the research of the Committee to
Study Compensation for Automobile Injuries, 22 which was directed
(taking the most charitable view) toward finding whether a particular
plan was better or worse in its entirety than the tort law system; nor
is it like the bits of subsequent research directed toward answering
the same question.23 It is multi-purpose research. Without doubt, it
may intensify the convictions of those who wish to displace tort law
with a compensation system. It may supply ammunition also to the
protagonists of the tort system. But it is designed primarily to
illuminate the facts, not to polarize them.
20. See, e.g., the bibliographic notes in SOMERS &: SOMERS, 'WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1954); see also the current bibliographies, "Book Reviews and Notes" in Monthly
Labor Review, and "Recent Publications" in Industrial and Labor Relations Review.
21. The National Safety Council reports that in 1962, 13,700 people died in work
related accidents and two million suffered injuries that disabled them beyond the day
of the accident. For the same period, 40,900 died in motor vehicle accidents and I.5
million suffered injuries that disabled them beyond the day of the accident. The
Council reports that the "cost" of work related accidents in 1962 was five billion dollars, while the "cost" of motor vehicle accidents in the same year was 7.5 billion dollars.
(A motor vehicle accident that happens during the course of the injurcd's employment
is counted both as a motor vehicle accident and as a work accident.) NATIONAL SAFETY
COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 3, 5 (1963 ed.). See also note 76 infra.
22. THE COLUMBIA REPORT.
23. See James &: Law, Compensation for Auto Accident Victims: A Story of Too
Little and Too Late, 26 CONN. B. J. 70 (1952).
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A. The Persistence of Injury Claims

Since most of the existing literature about injury victims concerns
litigation processes, a social observer might wonder at the outset
what fraction of the injury cases persist to the litigation stage. A
capsule answer may be given in the form of a table, starting with
the number of people who suffer losses in personal injury automobile
accidents and comparing the numbers who persist to various successive stages-hiring a lawyer, filing suit, commencing a trial, and
appealing a judgment. Taking all the injury cases. as one hundred
per cent, the Michigan survey indicated the following persistence
frequencies: 24
Persons
with
losses

100%

Persons
hiring
lawyers

Persons
starting
trial

Persons
appealing
to higher
court
0.1%

14%
0.6%
This table refers to the totality of persons who suffer economic
loss in personal injury accidents. A researcher into "law in action"
would presumably be interested in this totality, since tort law
purports to provide the same standards for injuries of all degrees
and the famous principle "de minimis" does not exclude tort injuries, however minute.25
A social scientist might prefer to confine his attention to cases
that present some significant impact on productivity and welfare.
For this reason, the Michigan study selected a group of "serious injury cases," defined as cases in which the injury victim had medical
expenses of five hundred dollars or more, was hospitalized for two
weeks or more, suffered a permanent physical impairment, or died.
For these cases the persistence was as follows: 26
Suffering
Hiring
Commencing
Appealing
serious
lawyers
trial
to higher
injury
court
100%
Even in this group, the legal apparatus touched less than half the
24. AACP 155 fig. 4-3, 241 fig. 7-2.
25. "The maxim [De minimis non curat lex] has no application to money demands."
BALLENTINE, LAW DICTIONARY 356 (1948 ed.). Although they do not explicitly so state,
the following works take this interpretation for their starting assumption in the calculation of damages in actions for negligence: HARPER &: JAMES, TORTS § 25.1 (1956);
McCORMICK, DAMAGES §§ 124 (a), 137 (1935); PROSSER, TOR1'S § 35 (d) (2d ed. 1955).
26. AACP 184 fig. 6-1, 241 fig. 7-2.
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injured persons, the trial process less than a tenth, and appellate
proceedings less than a hundredth.
These figures raise considerable doubt about what can be achieved for injury victims by improving the procedure of trial courts.
Even if courtroom procedures were ideally speedy, dignified, and
objective, their excellence would remain unfelt by ninety-five per
cent of the serious cases and the ninety-nine plus per cent of all
cases which are settled outside of court.
Improvement of trial procedures would improve the lot of the
mass of claimants only if all claimants could readily obtain a prompt
and fair trial. If that were true, settlement would naturally reflect
the expected result of such a trial. A contemplation of this possibility
leads to a second implication of the statistics. If a trial were obtained
by just one out of every nineteen of the serious injury victims who
now settle without trial, the number of trials conducted would
have to increase by one hundred per cent. A minute decrease in the
settlement rate would deluge the already overcrowded courts with
an even more oppressive mass of cases.
This observation leads to other conclusions. One is that the furnishing of speedy trials is likely to require a multiplication of courtrooms, judges, and juries far beyond anything that has been discussed
by the students of the law's delays. If trial facilities are not greatly
multiplied, no improvement in trial procedures is likely to do much
for nineteen-twentieths of the litigants. Improvements that make
court procedures more attractive will only increase the congestion.
A more likely means of reducing congestion is to find some method
of facilitating settlement without the necessity of trial.
B. The Sources of Reparation
Most of the prior information regarding compensation for injury
victims' losses has been directed single-mindedly at "damages"
paid because of adjudged or presumed liability of a "tortfeasor" to
an injury claimant. The main text of the Columbia report,27 and
the follow-up by a Yale group in 1950,28 reported only about these
payments. A part of the Columbia report that reported on compensation from other sources was relegated to an appendix and was
ignored in the Columbia recommendations.29
In the meantime, there has been a gigantic rise of new sources
27. THE

COLUMBIA REPORT.

28. James & Law, supra note 23.
29. THE COLUMBIA REPORT 218.
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of help likely to benefit an injury victim or his survivors. The first
of these is the system of survivors' benefits under the Old Age and
Survivors' Insurance program of the Social Security Administration
authorized by Congress in 1935.30 Because of this program, the
widow of a fatal injury victim is now assured of lifetime assistance
regardless of success in her claim for damages, provided her husband
was part of the vast working population that is covered by the
Social Security program. By 1960, this program offered potential
benefits to about eighty per cent of United States families. 31
The second invader of the reparation scene was health insurance,
which began a meteoric growth about 1940 and now covers, in one
form or another, about seventy per cent of Americans.32
The third entrant on the reparation stage was the Social Security
program of disability benefits, which began for older persons in
1956,88 but which first reached out to a majority of the working
population in November 1960.34
One of the striking discoveries of the last decade's research has
been the impact of the first two of these programs, along with other
rights outside the realm of tort law, on the welfare of injury victims.
The third of the items-the disability program-arrived too late
to be reflected in any of the studies published up to the time of
this writing.
Several surveys-two in Philadelphia, one in New Jersey, and
one in Michigan-have indicated that a half-dozen sources of compensation for accident losses have been added to "damages" under
tort law.35 The first Philadelphia study and the Michigan study
30. 49 Stat. 622 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-22 (1958), as amended, 42
U.S.C. §§ 401-22 (Supp. V, 1964).
31. Eighty-seven per cent of employed persons are potentially protected by Social
Security Survivors Insurance. AACP 42 table 1-1. To become a "fully insured individual," however, one must be in covered employment for any forty quarters, or for onefourth of the quarters between 1950 or his twenty-first birthday, whichever is later,
and his date of death or retirement, whichever is earlier, but at least six quarters.
Those who died before 1950 needed at least six quarters of coverage. 75 Stat. 137 (1961),
42 U.S.C. § 414 (Supp. V, 1964).
32. AACP 42 table 1-1, 71 fig. 1-3.
3!l. 70 Stat. 815 (1956), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 423-25 (1958).
34. 74 Stat. 967 (1960), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 423 (Supp. V, 1964).
35. AACP 146 table 4-8 shows the following percentages of persons injured in
automobile accidents who received some compensation from the following sources: injury victim's own insurance, 63%; tort liability settlements, 49%; employer [including
sick leave], 4%; workmen's compensation, I%: social security and other pensions,
1%: others, 3%, The total exceeds 100% because some respondents reported more than
one source of reparation.
Table 19 of Adams '60, at 26, shows the following percentages of persons injured
in automobile accidents who received some compensation from the following sources:
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provide quantitative estimates of the amounts received from some
of these programs. They indicate that tort damages provided only
about half of the total help that injury victims received.86
For two reasons, the actual contribution of the non-tort programs
is probably greater than the fifty per cent indicated by the Philadelphia and Michigan studies. One reason is the more rapid growth in
the total social security and health insurance programs than in the
tort liability program.81 In all likelihood, each doubling of health
insurance or OASDI volume is accompanied by an approximate
doubling of their contribution to automobile injury victims. A second reason for believing that the non-tort programs are greater
than indicated is that the conservative methods of estimation used
in the various surveys tended to understate social security payments
much more than they understated damage payments. In the Philadelphia studies, only benefits already received were counted; future
respondent's own insurance, 33.80%: the other party's insurance, 34.64%: the other
party personally, 3.93%; the respondent personally, 21.46%; temporary disability or unemployment insurance, 2.17%; workmen's compensation, 2.38%: other and unknown
sources [chiefly intra-family loans], 1.68%. The total equals exactly 100% because the
percentages were taken not with respect to the number of people responding, but with
respect to the total number of responses.
36. AACP 147 table 4-9 shows the following percentages of the aggregate amount
of reparation received from various sources: tort liability settlements, 55%: injured
person's own insurance, 38%; social security, 2%; employer [including sick leave), 1%:
workmen's compensation, less than ½ of I%: other, 4%.
Table 36, and the text at page 38 of Adams '60 show the following percentages of
the aggregate amount of reparation from the various sources: victim's insurer 37.07%:
other party's insurer, 32.42%; other party personally, 2.88%: respondent personally,
24.42%: temporary disability, unemployment insurance, and workmen's compensation,
3.21%.
AACP defined a class of injury victims labeled "serious" and studied these in addition to the general class of all personal injury accident victims. The arbitrary definition
of a serious injury was one that (1) required hospitalization for three weeks or more; or
(2) occasioned hospital and medical expenses of five hundred dollars or more; or (3)
occasioned death or some degree of permanent physical impairment. Figure 5-10, p.
174, shows the following percentage distribution of aggregate amounts of reparation
from the various sources in serious injury cases: tort liability, 46%; own insurance
[principally life, hospital-medical, and automobile insurance), 27%; future compensation expected [principally death and disability benefits under federal social security],
14%; others, 13%.
37. Pay-outs for disability and death by OASDI (the federal old age, survivors, and
disability insurance program) in 1960 were more than two hundred times those in
1940. STATISTICAL AllsrnACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1962, at 284. Pay-outs by automobile
liability insurance companies for the same periods are not available, but premiums for
automobile bodily injury liability in 1960 were about ten times those in 1940. INSURANCE STATISTICS, 1962, at 8. Although the growth rates of social insurance and health
insurance were not radically different from liability insurance during the 1950's, the
broad legislative extensions of disability insurance in 1960, 74 Stat. 967 (1960), 42 U.S.C.
§ 423 (Supp. V, 1964), and of health insurance in 1962, 76 Stat. 197 (1962), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1381-85 (Supp. V, 1964), seems to presage further surge of volume in the social and
health insurance areas. See generally AACP 71 fig. 1-3.
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benefits were excluded as too speculative.38 Since social security
benefits are generally paid in monthly instalments over a lifetime,
the exclusion of future payments resulted in their gross understatement.
There should be less understatement of social security benefits
in the Michigan survey, where future social security benefits were
estimated and included in the reparation total. But the future instalments were entered at discounted values in order to facilitate
comparison with damage payments and other lump sum payments.
In fact, they are eventually paid in full, not in discounted sums.
Thus, a more valid comparison would be one that would show the
actual amounts received throughout life from social security benefits
and the actual amounts received throughout life by damage claimants
from lump sum settlements plus any interest or profits received from
investing them. But this ideal projection would require an impossible
foreknowledge. Therefore, the more conservative statement of discounted present values had to be followed, despite its known bias.39
In the light of these revelations about the sources of reparation,
it is no longer satisfactory to analyze the welfare of injury victims
in terms of what they get in damages. The analysis must be in relation to the entire retinue of programs for the aid of the stricken.
These include health insurance, old age and disability insurance,
life insurance, collision and personal property insurance, sick leave
pay, workmen's compensation, public assistance, charity, and some
additional sources.40
C. The Costs of Loss Shifting
A third disclosure of the new studies is the fantastic variations
in the costs of distributing help in the various systems and the high
rate of expense of the damage system in relation to the benefits that
it distributes.
An impeccably documented study of lawyers' fees in New York
County showed that more than a third of the total amount of money
paid out as damages for personal injuries went to the claimants'
lawyers. 41 In Michigan a statewide survey of collection expenses
38. Morris &: Paul, supra note 6; Adams '55.
39. See AACP 372, 374 table 9-19 for a more complete explanation of the discounting of future payments of money to compute present value.
40. For example, a Veteran's Administration or municipal hospital may give free, or
virtually free, medical care in many cases. Surveys frequently do not or cannot count
this and consequently deal only with the money actually paid or promised to the injury victim. Cf. AACP 170-75.
41. Franklin, Chanin &: Mark, supra note 2, at 21, 25 chart III.
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(including lawyers' fees) showed them amounting to about a quarter
of the gross settlements.42 The broadly based Illinois study indicated
that more money was spent on legal expenses arising out of accidents in that state than was spent for medical treatment.43 The New
Jersey survey indicated high collection expenses, although no overall ratio estimate was attempted.44
The Michigan study also estimated total expenses of the damage
system, adding to lawyers' fees the litigation expenses of claimants
themselves, the costs of selling and administering insurance, and
the costs of keeping courts open for injury cases.45 This summation
indicated that the operating costs of the damage system are about
120 per cent of the net benefits that go to the injury victims themselves; the net amounts that the victims get are less than the total
retained by insurance companies, law offices, and courts, Presumably,
the cost ratio would be even higher in such states as New York and
Illinois, where it appears that the legal expenses are substantially
higher than in Michigan.46
In contrast, private loss insurance systems (embracing principally
life insurance and health insurance) showed average costs of about
twenty-two per cent of net benefits.47 In some Blue Cross systems
the operating costs drop to less than five per cent of the net benefits,
and in Social Security programs they drop to about two per cent.48
42. AACP 138 table 4-1 shows legal collection expenses to be 11.5 million dollars
in personal injury accident cases in Michigan in 1958, and table 4-2, p. 139, shows total
insured and uninsured tort liability reparation to be 46.7 million dollars for the same
period; thus legal collection expenses were 24.6% of tort liability reparation. AACP
190-92 discusses the cost of collection in serious injury cases; when some cost was incurred, the mean was thirty-two per cent of the total recovery.
43. Billingsley 8:: Jorgenson, supra note 8; ILL. DEPT. OF Pun. WoRKS AND BLDGs., DIV.
OF HIGHWAYS, op. cit supra note 8, at 95 table Cl-01.80-1; Jorgenson, supra note 8.
AACP 138 table 4-1 shows total collection expenses to be about forty-six per cent of
the total medical expenses: 11.5 million dollars total collection expenses and 25.1 million dollars total medical expenses.
44. Adams '55 at 55 table 34.
45. See AACP 59 table 1-4, 61 fig. 1-1.
46. Compare text at note 41 supra, with text at note 42 supra; see also note 43 supra.
47. This figure is not the expense rate of any particular system, but an average of
all systems. A sample of the variations included may be quickly gained by comparing
the loss ratios shown in BES'I''S FIRE AND CASUALTY AGGREGATES AND AVERAGES. In 1961,
stock companies reported aggregate loss ratios for individual hospital and medical insurance of 52.2%: for group accident and health of 82.9%: for workmen's compensa•
tion of 64.3%. On the other hand, Blue Cross insurance in 1961 had an average operating cost ratio of about 7%. Reed 8:: Rice, Private Consumer Expenditures for Medical
Care and Voluntary Health Insurance, 1948-62, Social Security Bulletin, Dec. 1963,
pp. 3, 9 table 7.
48. 2 HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL ECONOMICS: A STUDY OF POPULATION, SERVICES, COSTS,
METHODS OF PAYMENT, AND CONTROLS 1072 n. 1 (McNerney ed. 1962). Social Security
Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement, 1960, at pp. 6 table 7, 8-9 table 10, 8:: 21 table
21.
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The obvious lesson for those whose concern is the plight of the
injury victims is that an increase in the generosity of tort damages
is the most expensive way of bringing aid. Attention should be
directed instead to the broadening of social security protection,
group health insurance, and private loss insurance, in that order.
This does not mean that the damage system is bad or useless.
It does furnish compensation to injury victims. In fact, it furnishes
more compensation than any of the other systems taken alone.49
It also furnishes a way of forcing public attention to the needs of
those injury victims for whom no more merciful avenue is provided.
It also may serve to vindicate the innocent and admonish the guilty
and to provide an incentive to persons involved in accidents to give
the facts to the police. But these possible advantages should not be
confused with providing reparation for injury losses, which can be
done much more economically in a number of other ways.
D. The Maldistribution of Benefits

Another startling disclosure of the new studies is the capricious
pattern of compensation for injury victims. About half of the serious
injury victims are reimbursed less than half of their monetary loss,iso
to say nothing of their psychic losses of pain and suffering, anxiety,
humiliation, and bereavement. On the other hand, substantial percentages of victims receive two, three, four, or five times the amount
of their economic losses.is1
It would be logical, of course, that a substantial fraction of injury victims would receive nothing at all because of the commonlaw principle of contributory negligence. A rule of comparative
negligence, if adopted, might explain why hardly anyone gets his
full losses repaid and why the records show reparation ranging
from zero to one hundred per cent of the actual losses. The concept
of compensation for pain and suffering would explain also why some
claimants receive far more in dollar awards than the amount of
their economic losses.
But none of these theories would justify the distribution that
exists, with the least significant losers regularly receiving the largest
multiple of losses and the really tragic cases of permanent disability
receiving the smallest fraction. Yet this pattern is quite conclusively
shown in two independently conducted studies of the last decade.
49, AACP 139 table 4-2; id, at 147 table 4-9; id. at 151 fig. 4-1.
50. AACP 178-80.
51. Morris & Paul, supra note 6, at 917 fig. 1.
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The Pennsylvania study, starting at the bottom, presents compensation ratios on losses ranging in size from under one hundred dollars
to over three thousand dollars. In the "under one hundred dollars"
group, one out of three claimants obtained more than five times
the money he had lost. The ratios fell steadily as the amounts of
loss rose, until, in the over three thousand dollar group, no one received over five times his loss.52 The Michigan study picks up the
comparison with victims of losses under one thousand dollars in the
smallest group, rising to losses over twenty-five thousand dollars in the
largest significant group. Under one thousand dollars, thirty-two per
cent obtained more than one and one-half times their economic
loss; in the group with losses over twenty-five thousand dollars, only
five per cent got such a high ratio. 53 The same maldistribution was
reported by the Columbia study for accidents in 1929, measuring
damage compensation only.54 This whimsical pattern of compensation still prevailed in the 1950's, after social security, health insurance, and other sources of help had been added to the reparation
repertory.
E. Insulation of the Tort-feasor
A fifth conclusion impelled by recent research is that the individuals whose negligence causes accidents, or whose different conduct might have avoided them, pay an almost negligible share of
the total reparation received by injury victims. Even defendants
who had been sued did not know, in one-third of the cases, what
disposition had been made of the case. Defendants whose cases were
settled without the filing of an answer were ignorant of the outcome sixty-four per cent of the time.M Presumably, the percentage
of ignorance would be even higher among the ninety-five per cent
of potential defendants who were not even sued.
These facts nullify most of the underpinning of contemporary
tort theory. Tort theorists are accustomed to justify the law on the
ground that it makes the wrongdoer pay, or shifts the loss to the
wrongdoer. 56 These theories prove to be poetic fallacies. The losses
are not shifted to wrongdoers, but to right-doers: the conscientious
drivers who buy liability insurance.
These five lessons are not the only results of the new studies.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Ibid.
AACP 179 fig. 5-13.
THE COLUMBIA REPORT 62.
AACP 297 table 8-17.
James, Accident Liability Reconsidered, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948).
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But they are enough to present the broad outline of the human
problem that is to be treated. They also provide strong indications
that the problem is not likely to be solved within the confines of the
tort system, or even within the confines of all the existing systems.
The time has come to lay the existing systems to one side, to look at
the human needs that are to be met, and to design, on a clean sheet
of paper, the remedies that are needed.

III.

NEW PRESCRIPTIONS FOR ECONOMIC TREATMENT

The disclosures of recent research open the door to a fresh look
at reparation for automobile injuries. Reparation can now be viewed
as one of the processes of the social metabolism and examined for
evidence of hyper- or hypo-activity and for benign or malignant
effects. This view is made possible by new knowledge of the volume,
the speed, and the direction of the reparation flow.
In the following pages I should like to experiment with this
new approach. I will not pause to evaluate the important contributions to thought made by previous proposals. Like anyone else
who thinks about this problem area, I am tremendously indebted
to the Committee To Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents, whose Report has commanded the attention of legal writers
and thinkers for three decades. I am indebted to the many who kept
the subject alive in the ensuing decades, 57 a Duke (now Harvard)
professor named David F. Cavers,158 a Cincinnati judge named Robert
S. Marx,159 a Yale professor named Fleming James,60 a New York
justice named Samuel Hofstadter.61 I am grateful for the insights of
Albert Ehrenzweig,62 Leon Green, 63 Ame Fougner, 64 Clarence Mor57. Most recently, Marshall, The Unreality of Accident Litigation: A Plea for a
New Approach, 50 A.B.A.J. 713 (1964).
58. Symposium-Financial Protection for the Motor Accident Victim, 3 LAw &:
CoNTEMP. PRon. 465 (1936). This symposium contains several articles of current interest:
one on the uncompensated accident victim by Emma Corstvet, who made the important Connecticut Case Studies that were printed as an appendix in THE COLUMBIA
REPORT; one on the changing rules of automobile liability by Richard M. Nixon, later
vice-president of the United States; and one article on each side of the debate over an
automobile compensation plan, with Shippen Lewis taking the affirmative and P. Tecumseh Sherman the negative.
59. Marx, Compensation Insurance for Automobile Accident Victims: The Case for
Compulsory Automobile Compensation Insurance, 15 Omo ST. L.J. 134 (1954).
60. James, The Columbia Study of Compensation for Automobile Accidents: An
Unanswered Challenge, 59 CoLUM. L. REv. 408 (1959).
61. Hofstadter, Alternative Proposal to the Compensation Plan, 42 CORNELL L.Q.
59 (1956).
62. EHRENZWEIG, "FULL Am" INSURANCE FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1954).
63. GREEN, TRAFFIC VICTIMS: TORT LAW AND INSURANCE (1958).
64. Mr. Fougner, president of the Christiana General Insurance Company of New
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ris and James Paul65 and others who have offered fresh solutions to
the problem. I am fortunate to have seen papers by Professors
Keeton and O'Connell, 66 and by Kalven and Blum, 67 which have
brilliantly summarized and analyzed the results of three decades
of discussion of the Columbia compensation plan and its rivals.
Rather than to add a surrebutter to the arguments so masterfully
advanced, or even to color their classic disputations with the hues
of new evidence, I should like to make a new start from the social
situation. I propose to state what are the emergent needs discernible
in the social situation and the most likely ways, among society's
many loss-spreading devices, to remedy the ills. If this search leads
me back to tort law and compensation plans, I will not resist; if it
leaves the classic arguments untouched, I make no apology.
While I hope to take my inspiration from the findings of recent
research, I acknowledge that prescription of legal measures can
never be the product of purely scientific observation. Prescription
requires a large number of personal judgments of what things are
desirable and which things are more desirable. The prescriptions
that are proposed in the following pages for the reparation of
automobile injuries are not compelled by the findings of research;
they are the writer's personal opinions, formulated in the light of
research findings. The same findings may lead other researchers to
radically different conclusions.
A. Rehabilitation
The most important service that economic treatment can perform
is to assure the accessibility of medical treatment. Wounds should be
healed, bones set, prostheses supplied, psychic readjustment achieved,
and occupational retraining provided when needed.
These things should be done, it seems to me, for every victim,
regardless of whether or not the victim was himself careless, whether
or not the guilty driver can be found, and whether or not he can
pay or has purchased adequate insurance. Medical services should
York, has made several proposals in unpublished speeches to insurance and bar as•
sociations. A popular presentation of some of his ideas appears in Fougner Sc Rankin,
For Auto-Accident Victims-A New Kind of Insurance, Readers Digest, May 1961, p.
107.
65. Note 6 supra.
66. Keeton and O'Connell plan an article to be called "Basic Protection for the

Traffic Victim," or some similar title, to be published in the Harvard Law Review for
December 1964 and a book to be published by Little, Brown & Co. in 1965.
67. Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem-Auto
Compensation Plans, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 641 (1964).
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be supplied for humanitarian reasons-because the modern conscience demands that no one unnecessarily be left physically impaired. They should also be supplied for economic reasons-because
everyone loses when a member of society ceases to contribute to the
national product and becomes instead a burden on the shoulders of
others.
Fortunately, the need for medical treatment is being met very
well in the minor injury cases, which constitute the great majority
of cases. Probably the most important source is the victim's own
resources and those of his immediate family. This source has not
been measured by any study. After the victim's own family resources,
the next most important source is health insurance, now covering in
some measure seventy per cent of Americans.68 Tort law does not seem
to play a large role in paying medical bills, although it obviously tends
to restore the personal resources that have been applied, and the
prospect of getting damages may encourage private expenditure for
medical treatment. A considerable number of injury victims receive "free" medical or hospital care, and a great many receive
heavily subsidized care from public and private hospitals. There are
also cases in which large medicals bills are paid by charities.69
The Michigan survey asked how often necessary medical care
was lacking. No cases were found in which emergency care or treatment of acute conditions failed for financial reasons, although the
care given was "unsatisfactory" in about fourteen per cent of the
cases.70 On the other hand, a small but significant group failed for
financial reasons to receive rehabilitative care-resetting of bones,
cosmetic surgery, retraining in the use of muscles, and occupational
retraining. This type of failure appeared in only one to two per
cent of the serious injury cases, which translates into one to two
hundred cases a year in Michigan.
It is easy to see why rehabilitative treatment is frequently
missed. It is "elective" treatment in the sense that no acute suffering drives the patient inevitably toward it. It is most frequently
needed in very severe cases, in which months of unemployment and
medical bills have exhausted the patient's own resources, his own
medical insurance, and the damage settlement, if any. Damage
settlements are commonly restricted by insurance limits and legal
expenses to less than ten thousand dollars-an amount that is con68. AACP 42 table l·l.
69. See AACP 170-75.
70. AACP 77-81.
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sumed by less than a year of hospitalization. Furthermore, such
treatment is usually beyond the capacity of local doctors and hospitals. If the patient knows at all about the possibility of such treatment, he is confronted by the difficult choice of committing his last
resources of cash and property, if any, in order to submit himself
to further painful treatments for what must appear to be a dubious
result.
I submit that these omissions demand correction. Since they are
few in number, the maximum restoration of these individuals could
be paid for at a cost to all motorists that would hardly be noticed,
and the state itself would benefit by doing so.71
How should the omissions of rehabilitative treatment be supplied? The first requirement of an appropriate regime is that it
must miss no one. It cannot depend upon whether the accident is
due to the "fault" of some ascertained person, nor upon whether
insurance limits are high enough, nor upon whether the guilty
driver can be found, nor upon whether the injury victim is sufficiently litigious to bring a lawsuit or persuasive enough to make a
good witness. 72 Furthermore, it should be done by a system that is
totally divorced from payment of cash benefits. The patient must
not have the choice of spending his rehabilitation money for a new
house instead. Least of all should rehabilitation efforts be permitted
to use up money that the patient may need for subsistence.78
These considerations rule out any system based upon individual
71. It costs as much to support a disabled worker and his family for a year on relief
as to rehabilitate the worker so that he can become self-supporting. NATIONAL INSTI•
TUTE ON REHABILITATION AND WorutMEN'S COMPENSATION, REHABILITATING THE DIS•
ABLED WORKER: A PLATFORM FOR ACTION 122 (Berkowitz ed. 1963).
The case for rehabilitation has also been supported by the speeches and writings of
Ame Fougner. See note 65 supra.
72. Uninsured motorist insurance, unsatisfied judgment funds, and the New York
Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification plan all depend on someone being "liable"
for the accident. For a discussion of these and other gap closing devices, see Keeton 8:
O'Connell, Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim, section on "Closing the Gap in
Financial Responsibility" [To be published]. Adams '60 at pp. 49.54 compares the cost
of a Massachusetts type compulsory liability plan, a compensation scheme similar to a
workmen's compensation program, and the present New Jersey system: voluntary insurance both for loss and liability, a financial responsibility statute, and an unsatisfied
judgments fund. See also Comment, Uninsured Motorist Insurance: California's Latest
Answer to the Problem of the Financially Irresponsible Motorist, 48 CALIF. L. REv.
516 (1960).
73. Berkowitz, op. cit. supra note 71, at 45-58; SOMERS &: SOMERS, WorutMEN's COIII·
PENSATION 259-60 (1954); Cheit, Summary Statement, Occupational Disability Study, in
REsEARCH CONFERENCE ON "WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION
90-97 ijaffe ed. 1961); Leonard, Legal Roadblocks to Rehabilitation, 1963 PROC. SEC.
OF INS. NEG. &: COMP, LAW ABA 229.
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liability or private insurance. If the right to rehabilitation depends
upon finding the person "liable," even though negligence is removed, there will be cases where the victim goes uncompensated
because liable persons cannot be found or are uninsured. Private
loss insurance is also not the answer, because there is no practicable
way to make every potential accident victim buy insurance.74
An effective rehabilitation program requires a public fund that
will supply the needed services without regard to whether the person
who caused the loss is liable or can be found, or whether insurance
was purchased by an appropriate person, or whether the cost of the
benefits exceeds contractual limits. The important questions are how
such a fund can be raised and how it should be disbursed.
The disbursement question will be considered first. There are
two possibilities. One is a state rehabilitation office. Every state has
an appropriate public agency, although most of them are inadequately :financed and seem to be primarily oriented toward workrelated injuries, 715 although these are probably less serious than automobile injuries.76 The other possibility is a nonprofit association of
hospitals, which exists in nearly every state in the form of a Blue
Cross agency.77 At their best, these agencies are almost as economical
as public agencies-perhaps more so, when the hidden costs of public
agencies are considered.78
The second question-how the money should be raised-is truly
74. A plan under development in Massachusetts would change the law from com•
pulsory automobile liability insurance to compulsory health and accident insurance to
cover the entire family of an automobile owner at all times, and any other people who
might be injured in an accident involving his vehicle. Keeton &: O'Connell, op. cit•
.supra note 72.
75. The Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1920 was entitled "An act to provide
for the promotion of vocational rehabilitation of persons disabled in industry or otherwise and their return to civil employment." 41 Stat. 735 (1920). The most recent general amendments are the Vocational Rehabilitation Amendments of 1954, 68 Stat.
652, 29 U.S.C. §§ 21-42 (1958). There are no specific words disqualifying other injury
victims, but the act and the amendments certainly were meant to be primarily for the
benefit of workmen injured in their employment.
76. Recent statistics indicate that the total number of reported personal injuries is
greater from work accidents than from automobile accidents, but that the number of
fatalities is substantially higher for automobile accidents. NATIONAL SAFETY CouNcIL,
ACCIDENT FACTS (1963 ed.). If fatal automobile injuries are more frequent than fatal
work injuries, it is probable that disabling injuries are also more frequent. The larger
total number of work accidents presumably indicates either that the proportion of
minor injuries is larger in work accidents or (more likely) that the reporting of injuries
is more thorough in work accidents.
77. 2 McNERNEY, op. cit. supra note 48, at 1072.
78. Id. at 1072 n.1 lists the retention of Michigan Hospital Service (Blue Cross) as
less than four per cent.
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a secondary question, because the program is one that should be
carried out no matter how the money is raised. If it had to be taken
from general tax revenues, the program would still be worth undertaking. However, a better system would be to place a substantial
part of the cost on motorists, through a tax on automobile sales,
automobile registrations, gasoline and tire sales, or driver license
registrations. The choice among these alternatives presents problems
that are common to other reparation programs; they will be analyzed
on a later page.
A program of this sort should not be confused with the controversial programs of socialized medicine for all or for the aged. The
common criticisms of socialized medicine would have very little
applicability to a rehabilitation program tied to automobile injuries. Since rehabilitation services are seldom purchased by individuals from their own funds, there would be very little sacrifice of
any free choice. Since the injury must be shown to be automobilecaused, there are important checks on imaginary or chronic ailments.
Since rehabilitation requires specialized services, rarely if ever rendered by family doctors, there would be no destruction of a traditional doctor-patient relationship; in fact, family doctors would be
relied upon to refer rehabilitation patients to the proper clinics.
The only plausible argument that can be made against a program
of rehabilitation for automobile victims is that such a program is
equally necessary for victims of all other accidents. It may be true
that such a broad program will eventually be found to be desirable,
but there are excellent reasons for trying such a program first in the
limited area of automobile accidents. One reason is that the volume
of automobile litigation shows that there is a sense that justice demands reparation to an exent that does not exist with regard to
kitchen accidents or boating accidents. Another reason is that demands for automobile injury reparation are crowding the courts and
distorting the practice of law, so that some effort should be made to
siphon off the demand for reparation. A third reason is that automobile accidents are unlikely to be imagined or fabricated, because
they normally occur in public places and are subject to a system of
police reporting. A fourth reason is that enough is known about
automobile accidents so that their frequency can be predicted and
costs of a program estimated. Finally, there is a good possibility of
paying for rehabilitation of automobile victims by some sort of tax
on automobiles, which are already registered and serialized and,
therefore, amenable to taxation.
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B. Subsistence
The second most important service that needs to be performed
for injury victims is the provision of subsistence. A totally disabling
injury, whether permanent or temporary, suddenly plunges a wage
earner and his family into poverty. A permanently and totally disabling injury plunges even a non-wage earner, such as a child, into
a lifetime of hopeless dependence, ending in pauperism if and when
his parents are no longer able to provide support.
A great deal has already been done in the way of providing bare
subsistence. For the family of a fatally injured wage earner who had
about ten years of employment behind him, subsistence is now
generally provided through the OASDI program.79 It is also available for the totally and permanently disabled victim who has a similar
earnings record, starting six months after the injury or after such
longer period as is required to establish the permanence and totality
of the injury.80 But, there are important gaps in this program. The
most glaring is that of the disabled young person-a child, a student,
or a young workman-who has not yet worked his way into the
charmed circle of the "fully insured" under social security.81 Even
if he is "fully insured," but has fewer than twenty quarters of
coverage out of the last forty quarters, there are no disability benefits. 82 And, even for the fully covered disability victim, there is an
agonizing waiting period of many months before his disability is
determined to be "total and permanent." His medical bills are
tremendous, and his family still must eat and find shelter from the
elements. It is the desperate need during this period that often leads
injury victims to accept damage settlements of derisory amounts or
leads their lawyers to loan them money to avoid the necessity for
such settlements. The death of a young person with dependents
also may impose severe deprivation. If he was not "fully covered"
by forty quarters of earnings, survivors' benefits may be severely
reduced.
It seems to me that these victims and their families merit the
same level of subsistence that has been established by the social
security system and that seems to have missed these individuals
only because of the lack of a financial basis for the program. I sug79.
80.
81.
82.
(Supp.

74 Stat. 946 (1960).
72 Stat. 1020 (1958), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)3 (Supp. V, 1964).
See note 31 supra.
70 Stat. 815 (1956), 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)l (1958), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)l
V, 1964).
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gest that there is a suitable tax basis-the automobile-which should
be called upon to relieve this area of distress. For the dependents of
wage earners, payments should begin after about a week or two, as
in the case of workmen's compensation or unemployment compensation.83 For minors, who were presumably dependent on their
parents at the time the injury was incurred, that dependency might
be allowed to continue until the age of twenty-one, after which it
would be fair to provide the disability victim with the means of
minimum subsistence.
Obviously, the tort system is unsuited to supplying this kind of
assistance. It is geared to distinguish percipiently between the guilty
and the innocent and to measure the highly individualized losses,
both economic and psychic, of each claimant. Its expensive paraphernalia should not be wasted on a program that makes no such
discriminations. The subsistence program should operate with a
minimum of rules, distinctions, and administrative personnel. The
disbursing agency should be the same agency that already dispenses
this kind of aid-the Social Security Administration.
Like other subsistence programs-unemployment insurance and
OASDI-automobile accident benefits should be financed by a
specific tax, but not by an increase in the tax on payrolls. The
funds should come from taxes on motorists, just as for the rehabilitation program. The various forms that such a tax might take will
be discussed later in this article.

C. The Maintenance of Basic Income
Subsistence at social security levels is better than destitution,
but it is still at the boundary line of "poverty"-a domain that imposes disadvantages of health, education, and opportunity on those
who are within it. Obviously, everyone would be pleased if the
universal standard of living could be higher than this; that is the
goal of the "war on poverty." The question.is whether there is any
basis for a local battle against the poverty of automobile injury
victims-in other words, whether there is a need for a program for
the maintenance of income at a modest level of health and decency
that is somewhere above the level of social security subsistence.84
83. Waiting periods permit minor losses to be covered from the most 'efficient of all
sources-the injury victim's own resources. Compare SOMERS &: SOMERS, op. cit. supra
note 73, at 55.
84. The maximum benefit that a family can reap from social security on the basis
of a single member's contribution is 254 dollars per month (3,048 dollars per year).
The maximum that one individual can reap has recently been extended from $127 per
month to $133 per month ($1,596 per year). 72 Stat. 1013 (1958), 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)
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The problem is not an easy one. Presumably no one will advocate improving the lot of the injury victim so much that he is better
off than before he was injured. Therefore, people who live at the
subsistence level before they are injured must continue to live at
that level afterward. But, for those whose family income before
injury was something above three thousand dollars, there are obvious objectives in income protection beyond the level provided by
social security. One might aim, for instance, to maintain the income
of the former six thousand dollar a year family at 3,600 dollars, and
of the former twelve thousand dollar a year family at six thousand
dollars. One may justify this on the humanitarian side by recognizing that the demoralizing effect of a su,!:>sistence income of three
thousand dollars must be very different for a family that is accustomed to several times that much, than for those who have always
lived at that income level.85 On the utilitarian side, one must recognize that a program in which benefits are related to former earning
levels is a way of reinforcing the free enterprise system; it is not
an equalization of wealth, but rather is an extension of the rewards
of achievement.
One can hardly be satisfied with the existing devices that attempt
to protect the injury victim and his dependents from a catastrophic
plunge into poverty. One of these is the tort system, which provides
rather alluring lump sums to those who are injured, without contributory negligence, by drivers who can be identified, who are
demonstrably negligent, and who carry liability insurance. Unfortunately, about half the injury victims fall into the gaps of this
system instead of hitting the bases. Those who hit the bases must
hold out doggedly against cheap settlements. The alluring sums are
generally limited to the ten thousand dollar insurance limit less collection expenses, so that the net is utterly inadequate to make a
significant income supplement over a lifetime. Since most injury
(1958), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 415(a) (Supp. V, 1964). The Social Security Bulletin,
Aug. 1963, p. 2 reported that in April of 1963 the average disability benefit award to
disabled workers reached an all-time high of $90.20 for the month or, if extended to a
full year, $1,080. This should be compared with the three thousand dollars per year
income for an urban family of four that the President's Council of Economic Advisors
describes as the breaking point between poverty and minimum maintenance. N.Y.
Times, Jan. 21, 1964, p. 17, col. 4.
85. While writing generally on poverty in the United States, Michael Harrington
discusses an urban family of four living on 6,147 dollars per year. He concludes, "Clearly, this is not a budget for the gracious living depicted by the American magazines.
It is not, in contemporary terms, poverty or anything like it. But such a family would
face a serious crisis in the event of a protracted illness or long-term unemployment for
the family head.'' HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA 181 (1962).
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victims do not enjoy investment advisory services, it is miraculous if
the lump sum is invested so as to return any income at all a few years
after the accident.
Another income supplement comes from sick leave pay and
group disability insurance provided by employers for their entire
group of employees.86 The growth of these programs is heartening,
but nearly all cover relatively short terms, ranging from a few
months to two years.
Many people carry individual insurance against disability. This
seems like an excellent solution, since it permits each wage earner
to determine his own income protection needs. However, it appeals
to relatively few custome:i.;s and has a high operating expense rate.87
These considerations in favor of an income maintenance plan
are reinforced by reflection on a half-century of experience with
workmen's compensation, which is supported by the $ame basic
considerations. Although workmen's compensation is widely criticized, no one proposes to do away with its program of income replacement benefits based upon a scale related to prior earnings. One
might also reflect upon the program of unemployment insurance,
which aims to supply income on a graded scale to those who have
been deprived of it.
The mystery is not why there should be a basic income maintenance program for automobile injury victims, but why it has been
delayed so long. Workmen's compensation probably gained many
votes 'because of the illusion that it would make the employers pay,
although sophisticated observers generally recognized that costs
would be passed on to consumers.88 Automobile compensation has
no such political leverage because it visibly burdens all automobile
owners, who are nearly as numerous and often the same as the persons who might be benefited. What is more, it destroys the illusion
of the tort system, which purports to place losses on the "negligent,"
86. In 1960, about 21 million persons had group income loss protection. SOURCE
BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA, 1962, at 21. The aggregate loss ratio for stock company individual accident insurance for 1961 was reported at 43.1 %, which may be
translated to a ratio of operating expenses to benefits paid of 132%, BESr's FIRE AND
CAsuALTY AGGREGATES AND AVERAGES 125 (1961). See also Skolnik, Income-Loss Protection
Against Short-Term Sickness, 1948-62, Social Security Bulletin, Jan. 1964, p. 9.
87. Like private health and accident insurance, however, private insurance against
income loss is growing in importance. Id. at IO.
88. The cost of industrial accidents is "a legitimate cost of production." SOMERS &:
So:MERS, op. cit. supra note 73, at 27. The authors ascribe the following phrase to Lloyd
George: "The cost of the product should bear the blood of the workingman." Id. at
28 n. 16.
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although the bill is really paid by the mass of conscientious automoblie owners who pay insurance premiums.
A second factor that has inhibited development of an income
maintenance program for automobile victims is the doctrinaire position adhered to by proponents of automobile compensation plans
that they must displace tort law.89 This position is a result of
slavishly copying the historical compromises of workmen's compensation, which resulted from the impotent position of workmen
under common law.90 The automobile injury claimant has no need
to make so poor a bargain. Moreover, this form of proposal solidifies the opposition of the whole phalanx of general practitioners
and claimants' lawyers who are the injury victims' natural allies.
What is proposed here is a basic income maintenance plan for
wage earners, which would have only incidental effects on tort law.
Overwhelming considerations of economic utility point toward it.
The only question is how it can be most effectively implemented.
Broadening the tort law regime would not be an efficient way of
providing income replacement. Because tort law is slow, it misses
the months when income is most needed. Because it pays in a lump
sum, it affords no guarantee of continued support. Because it is expensive to operate, it needlessly doubles the burdens of those who
must pay the bill.
The social security regime also seems unfitted to do the job of
income replacement above poverty levels. Although social security
programs in other countries manage to award varying pensions
according to the preceding pay rate, the American system is attached
to a virtually level benefit rate, subject only to deduction for inadequate years of coverage or an insufficient wage base. To introduce
a system of graded benefits into the social security system would be
to create formidable administrative and political complications.
Two general types of systems can be envisaged that would efficiently fill the need for basic income maintenance above the subsistence level. The best from a schematic viewpoint would be a
single fund to which all drivers or owners would contribute taxes
assessed at rates based upon the varying accident frequencies of
various classes among them. This system would have the advantage
of eliminating the expensive search for the particular automobile
or combination of automobiles that caused the damage. It would
also eliminate the needless expense of selling individual policies to
89. E.g., THE COLUMBIA REPORT 132; EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 63, at 20.
90. DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 1-52 (1936).

304

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 63:279

individual owners and the competition of insurance companies for
the patronage of each automobile driver. The fund could be
operated by a government corporation or by a franchised private
monopoly in which all insurance companies would be permitted to
participate; in either case, it would eliminate the complexity that
results from regulating a multiplicity of dissimilar companies and
compelling each to accept its proportionate share of undesirable
risks.
But there are strong arguments against the monopoly system.
Since tort liability insurance will continue to exist, the monopoly
system would create a perpetual rivalry between the competitive
and the monopoly insurance sectors. It would bring a host of economic issues and management problems into the realm of politics
and remove them from the forces of the market place. The choice is
closely parallel to the classic conflict between "state fund" and
"private insurance" systems of workmen's compensation. Since both
systems are now functioning effectively in workmen's compensation
programs of various states, probably either system could effectively
maintain basic income for automobile injury victims.91
Benefits under a basic income maintenance regime should be
limited to some fraction of the lost wage and should be subject to a
ceiling that would not be higher than the national average wage.92
91. Dodd reviews the advantages claimed for state funds, private stock companies,
and private mutual companies. Id. at 532-37. He concludes, "In reviewing the advantages claimed by each type of insurance system a striking similarity is noticeable. Each
class of carrier alleges that it offers sounder security and a higher grade of service than
the others, and, if it cannot lay claim to lower cost, the contention is advanced that the
services rendered policy-holders are worth the higher premium." Id. at 537.
92. The states have set different percentages of the injured workman's wage as the
maximum that he may receive. In addition, each state has set a maximum number of
weeks during which one may receive this benefit, or a maximum number of dollars
that he may collect, or, often, both. A chart of the states and their provisions in this
respect appears in SOMERS & SOMERS, op. cit. supra note 73, at table III-B. Some writers
have stated that one cannot give the beneficiary 100% of the injured man's previous
wage because this would foster malingering among the partially or temporarily disabled. As the authors point out, however, the dead and the permanent-totally disabled
do not malinger, and it is in their cases that the absolute maximums have the most
pronounced effect. Id. at 83. The authors also make this interesting comment on the
relationship between the percentages and the absolute maximums: "If it is claimed
,that a percentage of wages should form the basis of compensation, such percentages
themselves represent maximums. The additional maximums not only create inequalities
of treatment but, because legislatures cannot be expected regularly to relegislate the
absolute amounts to keep up with shifts in wage levels, they also vitiate the original
claims of the law.
"Americans generally take pride that our social security systems attempt to take
account of the varying wage levels of beneficiaries as distinguished from the flat-sum
benefits in England. In actuality, the workmen's compensation laws are approaching a
flat-sum system, at a low level, and doing it with complex formulas. There appears to
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The fractional character is important because of the moral dangers
of making invalidism as attractive as working. 93 The prin~iple of
full reparation is appropriately reserved, as under tort law, to beneficiaries who can prove themselves completely innocent of contributory fault. The ceiling is important for more subtle reasons. On
the plane of economic theory, one may believe that the social gain
in raising a man's income from five thousand dollars to 7,500 dollars
is less than in raising it from 2,500 dollars to five thousand dollars.94
On the plane of political reality, one may be sure that the public
will never support a compulsory program for maintaining invalids
at a higher income level than the average worker earns.
It is true that fractional benefit rates and the benefit ceilings
have been a subject of bitter animadversion in the law of workmen's
compensation.95 But, the curse would be mitigated in the proposed
automobile system because a tort action for uncompensated losses
will remain available to the deserving.

D. Other Losses: Property Damage and Psychic Harm
If new programs of reparation to supply rehabilitation, subsistence, and income replacement were adopted, other losses of
considerable magnitude would still remain to be considered. Among
the most prominent of these are property damage (chiefly to automobiles) and psychic losses.
Damage to an automobile, unlike disabling injury or death to
an individual, does not seem to call for any new measures in aid of
injury victims. Automobiles are generally insured much more adequately than life and limb, partly because of the beneficent insistence of finance companies.96 There is usually a deductible amount,
be no justification in equity or in the theory of workmen's compensation for imposing
maximums upon maximums." Id. at 82.
93. Cf. Resolution of the Section of Insurance, Negligence and Compensation Law
of the American Bar Association, 1962 PROC. SEC. OF INS. NEG. AND COMP. LAw, ABA
392, 393 (1962).
94. The theory of "diminishing utility" of money is discussed in many economic
texts; it is reviewed in relation to automobile injuries in AACP 110-15.
95. "Virtually all students of the subject are in agreement as to the inadequacy of
present cash benefits to meet the needs of the families affected." SOMERS 8: SOMERS, op.
cit. supra note 73, at 82.
"The present scale of benefits provided for disabled workers and their dependents
does not reach even a subsistence level under present living costs." U.S. Bureau of
Labor Standards Bull., No. 85, 1946, p. 21.
"Almost all compensation payments are inadequate by present-day standards ••••"
2 THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE HEALTii NEEDS OF THE NATION, BUILDING AMERICA'S HEALTH 77 (1953).
96. See Adams '60, at 19.
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but this is precisely because most automobile owners find it cheaper
to pay their own bills than to employ a corporation to pay on their
behalf; to install a full compensation plan would result in doing
expensively what is now done cheaply.
Little distress is created by the automobiles not covered by collision insurance. People with cars of small value are likely 'to omit
collision insurance because they can afford to replace their cars
more easily than to insure them. Any compensation system applied
to such cases would be a useless burden.
There remain a few real or imaginary cases in which a man's car
is demolished, he lacks the means to replace it, and the absence of
a car imposes severe hardship. In one case discovered in the Michigan survey, a salesman who needed a new car accepted a ridiculously
low settlement for his wife's back injury because he needed money
to replace his car, which had been wrecked in her accident. One
wonders if other means of raising a down payment-such as a personal loan-could not have been found; but, in any event, the
deprivation in this case did not last long. If a family were too poor
to finance a new car, they would probably be too poor to own it
after purchase. The problem, then, is lack of income maintenance,
rather than lack of reparation for the automobile. The loss of a
car can impose severe hardship on a poor man and his family, but
it is not a type of hardship that seems to call for society to intervene
beyond the limits of tort law.
Pain, suffering, humiliation, and bereavement are also unsuitable subjects for a compensation plan. If they are so severe as to
cause disability, the disability should be compensated as in other
cases and for the same reasons. But it is doubtful that health and
productivity-with which all of society is concerned-are substantially promoted by making other innocent members of society compensate the psychic sufferers. In addition, psychic losses do not lend
themselves to any known regime of standardized treatment. No
system has been proposed that could measure them otherwise than
by the guess of twelve laymen. Thus, as is the case with property
damage, psychic losses are properly left to the mercies of tort
liability.

IV.

ADAPTATIONS OF THE TORT SYSTEM

Nothing that has been disclosed by recent factual research or the
experience of foreign countries has indicated that the tort system of
reparation for automobile injuries should be abolished. To be sure,
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it has been shown to be inadequate; that is a reason for supplementing it, not for abolishing it. It has been shown to be expensive; that
is a good reason for shifting to other regimes the things that they
can do better. But there remain many tasks that the tort system alone
can perform. These include, in appropriate cases, the restoration of
earnings above the minimal level that a universal insurance system
will support, the reparation of property loss and psychic loss, the
vindication of the innocent, and the punishment or admonition of
the guilty. The tort system should be preserved and considerably
amended to achieve these purposes.
It should be preserved also because it supplies a powerful incentive to keep the other systems working. Since it has no arbitrary
ceilings, it provides a constant incentive to keep earnings restoration
at reasonable levels; it is a safeguard against the obsolescent levels of
compensation that have persisted in many workmen's compensation
regimes. 07 Through the jury, it brings the popular conscience to bear
in deciding when and how much reparation should be given. It is the
tort system that has forced upon public consciousness the inadequacies of present reparation for automobile injuries and the absence of it in industrial injuries that has permitted that system to
stagnate.
The major charge that has been leveled against the tort system
in this paper and elsewhere is that it is ~ inefficient loss-spreading
device. This is true. But it is a charge that will lose force when some
of the functions of loss shifting have been cared for by more appropriate means. If new systems of rehabilitation, of subsistence, and of
basic wage maintenance are introduced, the tort system will
be miraculously cured of most of its ailments. Appellate judges will
no longer find it necessary to distort principles of fault in order to
provide social justice for injury victims. Juries will no longer feel
so irresistibly the impulse to disregard instructions in order to help
the impoverished. Injury victims will be less likely to accept derisory
settlements because they need money so urgently. Delay of trial will
no longer be so powerful a weapon in the hands of the defense.
In addition, a tremendous simplification of the insurance scene
will result from the provision of loss-redistribution devices outside
the tort system. There will be much less need for compulsory liability insurance, financial responsibility laws, or an unsatisfied judgment fund. If liability insurance becomes less essential, there will be
97. CHEIT, INJURY AND RECOVERY IN TIIE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT
SOMERS &: SOMERS, op. cit. supra note 73, at 82-83.

94-150 (1961);
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better reasons for freeing premium rates for liability insurance from
administrative regulation and leaving them to the forces of the
market place.
In short, the most glaring inadequacies of the tort system can be
remedied without touching a line of tort law. Nevertheless, changes
in tort law should be made, and some of them will become more urgent as well as more feasible because an underpinning of loss-shifting
through social insurance has been provided. Among the myriad improvements that should be adopted, considered, or studied, I will
mention here only the ones that are most relevant to other proposed
reforms and to the disclosures of recent research.

A. Correlation of Benefit Programs
An outstanding need of tort law today is for systematic correlation with other benefit programs. Recent research shows that most
injury victims receive reparation from more than one source and
that the total received from non-tort sources is about equal to that
from the tort source.98 Moreover, the non-tort sources have grown
much more rapidly in the past thirty years than the tort sources, so
that the need of correlation is a rapidly increasing one.99
There are three possible approaches to the problems raised by
parallel benefit systems. One is cumulation: awarding reparation
under each of the parallel systems without regard to reparation received under any of the others. A second is subrogation: permitting
one regime to get reimbursement from another regime. A third is
deduction: denying reparation under one regime because reparation
has been received or can be obtained from another.
For the most part, tort law follows the cumulation system. A person who has received disability insurance benefits from a private
insurance policy, or from the social security system, or from both
has an undiminished right to obtain, in a tort action, payments for all
his losses.100 This solution does not seem to be based upon a conviction that it is socially desirable for anyone to be thrice paid, but
rather upon a policy of nonrecognition or refusal to face the problem. Its real origin is obviously historical; tort law was born and
98. On the multitude of sources of reparation, see AACP 146 table 4·8, and the accompanying text. On the aggregates of the various sources, see AACP 147 table 4-9.
99. See AACP 70 fig. 1-2, 71 fig. 1-3, 175-80.
100. 2 HARPER &: JAMES, TORTS § 25.22 (1956); McCORMICK, DAMAGES §§ 87, 90
(1935). See Eichel v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 375 U.S. 253 (1963), where the Court held that in a
railroad worker's suit against the railroad for personal injury the trial court properly
excluded evidence that the claimant was receiving $190 in pension benefits under the
Railroad Retirement Act.
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brought up before other loss-shifting regimes existed to any significant extent; judges seem to assume that if any accommodation is to
be done, it is the responsibility of the newly arrived regimes, not of
tort law. This attitude is suggested by the frequently used term "collateral sources rule," under which it is assumed that the main thing
is the tort law and that all other programs are "collateral." 101
Some obvious afterthoughts have been offered as justifications for
the cumulation of benefits. It is sometimes said that the injury victim's luck or foresight in obtaining additional sources of reparation
should not relieve the burden of the wrongdoer. This argument is
quite irrelevant to most modern automobile accidents, since the
damages aren't paid by vvrongdoers, but instead are paid by insurance companies who collect their premiums from all the millions of
automobile owners who buy insurance; it would have real relevance
only in those very rare cases in which the negligent motorist pays
damages from his own pocket. Even then, it would be strikingly inconsistent with the whole process of damage assessment, which is
based upon the amount of loss and not at all (except in the case of
punitive damages) upon the amount necessary to punish or admonish the wrongdoer.
Another justification sometimes offered is that noncumulation
would deprive the injury victim of the benefit of the loss insurance
that he has "bought" by paying premiums or social security taxes.
This argument assumes that the injury victim has chosen his insurance with the contemplation of getting it plus tort damages. Of
course, the assumption is completely vacuous as far as concerns social security. Applied to purely private contractual insurance, the
argument is somewhat unrealistic in assuming that the purchaser
has anything in mind so remote as double payment. However, it
does contain a germ of truth, in that private insurers could, if they
wished, provide in their policies for subrogating themselves to the
insured's right against third parties, and they seldom do so except in
the case of health insurance and property insurance.
The crucial question about cumulation is whether it is sound
public policy. It certainly is not. Presumably, everyone would admit
that there is at best a waste of resources in taking money from others
to overpay for losses, except where damages are assessed by way of
punishment. In the area of property insurance, the law has very
IOI. I.e., collateral to the defendant. See 2 HARPER. &:

JAMES, TORTS §

James, Tort Law in Midstream: Its Challenge to the Judicial Process, 8
REv. 815, 835 (1959).

25.22 (1956);
BUFFALO L.
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properly recognized that it is against public policy to permit anyone
to overinsure. 102 Although it is less likely that anyone will deliberately injure himself in order to get money than it is that he will deliberately injure his property for the same reason, there are two very
real perils in overcompensation. One is the possible encouragement
of a devil-may-care attitude toward one's own safety, which seems to
be entirely too frequent among drivers. Another is the loss of public
confidence in the reparation system that results from overcompensation. It probably builds up, on the one hand, a credo among claimants that they are entitled to a little profit or compensation for the
trouble of collecting compensation and, on the other hand, a cynical
belief among claim agents and jurors that nearly everybody is getting overpaid, so that there is no real need for the liability insurer
to repay the entire loss.103
It is unlikely that the cumulation of benefits rule would have enjoyed the tolerance accorded it if the lawgivers understood how great
are the possibilities of overpayment and how many sources of uncorrelated compensation are sometimes available. Recognition of
the true situation will probably push the law in the direction of one
of the noncumulative solutions-subrogation or deduction.
Subrogation is the solution that tort law ordinarily applies to
property loss situations. If an insurance company has insured an
automobile owner against collision damage and has paid a damage
bill, it is entitled to be repaid by any tort-feasor who is responsible
for the damage. Recently, clauses have been inserted in health insurance policies that entitle hospital and medical insurers to similar
reimbursement.104 The theory of subrogation rests upon the assumptions that losses should not be overpaid and that it is better for the
costs to be borne by the guilty tort-feasors than by the innocent
buyers of loss insurance. Both propositions are completely sound,
and the practice of subrogation often leads to the best possible allocation of loss in property cases.
If subrogation were frictionless, there would be a good deal to
be said for the subrogation of insurers of life, disability, and health.
102. For a discussion of this in relation to the present context, see 2 HARPER 8c
JAMES, TORTS § 25.22, at 1350-51 (1956).
103. HUNTING 8c NEUWIRTH, WHO SUES IN NEW YORK CITY? 29, 41, 43, 88, 132 (1962),
104. See Kimball &: Davis, The Extension of Insurance Subrogation, 60 MICH. L,
REv. 841, 861-62 (1962). In their conclusions, the authors discuss the methods that might
be used to extend subrogation, but they decline to comment on its advisability. Id. at
869. See also HoRN, SUBROGATION IN INSURANCE THEORY AND PRACTICE (1964), a comprehensive review of subrogation problems which came to the author's attention after
the present article was completed.
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The heavily burdened Blue Cross system would be relieved of some
of its expenses, which would be loaded onto liability insurance.
Health insurance would cost less, and the price of automobile ownership would reflect more accurately the total costs that it occasions.
But this advantage would be bought at a startling cost. Consider
the case of a one thousand dollar hospital bill incurred by a Blue
Cross policyholder. When his bill is paid by Blue Cross, the cost to
all Blue Cross policyholders combined is about 1,080 dollars.105 Assume further that Blue Cross obtains reimbursement by virtue of
subrogation from Drivers' Liability Company, which has insured the
tort-feasor. Blue Cross will presumably pay at least twenty-five per
cent in collection expenses and will net about 750 dollars out of the
one thousand dollars paid by Drivers' Liability. But the policyholders of Drivers' Liability will have incurred corresponding premium
costs of sixteen hundred dollars, since liability insurers work at an
expense rate equivalent to about sixty per cent of payouts.106 The
net effect of the subrogation is to make liability insurance policyholders pay sixteen hundred dollars in order to save 750 dollars for
health insurance policyholders. Probably a large majority of the
health insurance policyholders are also liability insurance policyholders, who have their costs doubled by subrogation without any
increase of their benefits. The principal beneficiaries of the shift
are insurance companies and lawyers.
These rough calculations find interesting echoes in the experience of foreign countries. Professor Street reports that health insurers
in Great Britain in a recent year found that collection expenses for
one class of subrogation claims amounted to ninety per cent of the
collections.107 In Sweden, subrogation of health insurance was aban105. In 1962, Blue Cross plans had operating costs of 5.7% of income. Blue Shield
plans had I 1.0%. The total Blue Cross-Blue Shield plan operating cost as a percentage
of income was 7.2%. This would amount to about 8% of payouts. Reed & Rice, Private
Consumer Expenditures for Medical Care and Voluntary Health Insurance, 1948-62,
Social Security Bulletin, Dec. 1963, p. 11 table 10.
106. Compare payouts of 1.494 billion dollars with insurance expense of 926 mil•
lion dollars. AACP 48, 54. Another source of similar ratios is BEST'S FIRE AND CASUALTY
AGGREGATES AND AVERAGES. The 1961 edition shows automobile bodily injury losses as
59.4% of premiums earned for stock companies, 60.2% for mutuals. Id., 1961, at 133,
205. For a somewhat similar calculation of costs on subrogation of a health insurer, see
HORN, op. cit supra, note 104, at 115-16. Horn indicates, however, that subrogation in
property damage claims can be made quite economical. Id. at 130.
107. To collect 82 thousand pounds in income the hospitals paid out 73 thousand
pounds in collection expense. AACP 425.
In addition, British insurers have widespread "knock for knock" agreements where•
by neither company will sue the other for property damage to the automobile. Instead,
each company pays its own insured under the comprehensive part of his policy. This
reduces the total cost of automobile insurance by eliminating the expense of the unnecessary step of the loss insurer suing the liability insurer. AACP 432-33.
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doned on the ground that it was a mere shifting of expense from
one of a man's pockets to the other.108
Subrogation, then, is a solution that would have theoretical attractions but that seems to involve incidental costs which outweigh
its benefits. One must applaud the conclusion reached many years
ago by Professor James, on a more intuitive analysis, that losses
should be left with the first loss-distributing agency that incurs
them and not reshifted to other loss-distributing agencies.100
If subrogation is rejected, how is cumulation of benefits to be
avoided? The alternative is deduction. Deduction should most obviously be applied when an injury victim receives free or donated
care. Suppose, for instance, a child is struck by an automobile and
incurs a potentially crippling injury. After his health insurance is
exhausted, treatments are continued at the charge of the Society for
Crippled Children. After treatment is concluded, his claim against
the tort-feasor comes to trial. Is he entitled to include in his tort
claim the value of the medical treatment received at the expense of
the Society? It has no claim to subrogation, since it paid for the
services as a free gift. The law is in confusion, but there is some
indication that the child is entitled to receive the fair value of the
medical services he received.110 If this is the law, it should be
changed. The expenses paid by a charitable agency should be deducted or excluded from the amount otherwise recoverable. The
same conclusion seems warranted with respect to the health insurance
which, in the hypothetical case, paid for the child's initial emergency
treatment and which is subject to either cumulation or subrogation
under present law.111 It should be deducted from recoverable damages in the interests of minimizing the total cost to society.
108. AACP 445-46.
109. James, Indemnity, Subrogation, and Contribution and the Efficient Distribution of Accident Losses, 21 NACCA L. J. 360 (1958). See also 2 HARPER &: JAMES, TORTS
op. cit. supra note 102, § 25.23, at 1355. For a very competent defense of subrogation,
see HORN, op. cit. supra, note 104. Most of Hom's arguments and statistics relate to
property insurance, not personal insurance.
110. See McCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 100, § 90, at 325. "The generalized standard
of the 'value' of the necessary services rather than the theory of reimbursement for the
specific outlay, offers a ready basis on which to justify recovery."
Harper and James admit that the individual may recover the value of services actually paid for by a government agency, but they maintain that it ought not to be allowed, arguing that the government does not mean to confer a bounty on the recipient,
but merely to make certain that his needs are fulfilled; when the government has paid
for these needs, the defendant need not. 2 HARPER &: JAMES, TORTS § 25.22, at 1350
(1956). Conversely, if the wrong-doer is to be punished by being made to pay, the government does not mean to relieve him of this duty by paying the plaintiff's expenses.
111. See authorities cited in note 100 supra.
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There is one weakness in this solution. It leads to the concealment of a part of the cost of automobile operation. It is not necessarily important that every penny of the costs of automobile operation be shifted to motorists; but, if it should be done in this instance,
there is a much cheaper device than subrogation. That is to impose a
tax on motorists and use the proceeds to subsidize public health
facilities. This can probably be done at an operating cost of under
three per cent, instead of over 120 per cent.112
The case for deduction of benefits is just as strong with respect
to disability and survivorship benefits under the social security system. Consider the case of a man who is totally and permanently disabled; his former income was five thousand dollars a year; under
OASDI it will be about 1,500 dollars.113 Should tort damages be assessed at five thousand dollars a year or at 3,500 dollars? The latter
figure is obviously the one that corresponds to the facts and to the
theory that damages are to compensate loss, not to generate profit.
In opposition to this obvious lesson, the argument will be made
that, if damages are reduced, motorists will fail to pay the total costs
of automobile operation. If this objective is desired, it can be done
simply enough; an automobile tax can be imposed, with proceeds
going to the OASDI investment fund.
Private life insurance benefits present quite a different case and
ordinarily should not be deducted from tort damages. A large fraction of life insurance benefits is a return of savings, which could
be cashed in or borrowed upon before death. This is no more
appropriate for deduction than is a savings account. Another
large part of life insurance benefits is not protection against loss,
but gifts; they are the counterpart of old-fashioned legacies.114 There
is no public policy against legacies, and the law should not seek to
nullify contractual arrangements to confer them. But, even if life insurance were deductible in theory, there would be few cases for
the deduction. The death cases are large loss cases, and evidence
shows that most large economic losses are grossly underpaid, rather
than overpaid.
·
There remain a few cases where over-compensation of large losses
occurs, and one may speculate on whether the jury should be in112. See AACP 59 table 1-4, 61 fig. 1-1.
113. 70 Stat. 815 (1956), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)2 (Supp. V, 1964); 72 Stat.
1013 (1958), 42 U.S.C. § 415(a) (1958), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 415(a) (Supp. V, 1964).
114. On the basis of an analogy between life insurance and a savings account or an
annuity, Harper and James reach the conclusion that life insurance should not be deducted. 2 HARPER &: JAMES, TORTS § 25.22, at 1350-52 (1956).
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formed of the life insurance benefits .and instructed to deduct them
in proper cases. Probably everyone would concede the advantage of
deducting flight insurance benefits from damages in suits against airline companies. In many cases where the evidence would fail to void
the insurance contract, it would nevertheless show such lack of
donative intent that the collection of cumulative tort damages
should be denied. Although this type of problem has been best publicized in airline cases, the Harvard Public Health studies have indicated that it also exists in automotive murder or suicide.115 To let
the jury deduct life insurance benefits would tend to reduce the
moral risk inherent in compensation for death.
A second reason for letting the jury consider life insurance
benefits is more subtle. It involves a recognition that the jury does
its job not only by following literally the instructions that the judge
gives, but also by tempering the law with "fireside equity." 116 But
the jury's view of fireside equity is half-blinded if it is not told about
the non-tort sources of reparation that are available to the accident
victim's survivors.
For these reasons, I advocate that life insurance benefits, like
other benefits, should be deductible from tort damages when the
jury finds that they represent an excess over policy reserve values
and that the policies were not purchased with donative intent. The
gross damages from which they would be deducted would include
compensation for grief according to existing tort principles. The
main objective is that the jury should make its decisions with full
knowledge of dependents' insurance resources.
B. Promoting Settlements
Probably the most notorious of the evils of the tort system is
the tremendous duration of cases, of which less than half are settled
within a year and many not for two or three years.117 Although the
human tragedy of delayed settlements will be greatly alleviated if
the "new prescriptions" proposed in the preceding pages are adopted,
there will still be powerful reasons for promoting early settlements.
Deprivation in 1964 can not be erased by surplus in 1967. The
height of the ridiculous is achieved when a man's heirs enjoy compensation for their ancestor's prolonged suffering. Furthermore,
115. See REsEARCH ON FATAL HIGHWAY COLLISIONS, PAPERS 1961-62 (Mosely ed.); id.,
PAPERS 1962·63, at 85-86.
116. See JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 18-20, 37-38, 125-26 (1962) (quotation
from Sir Patrick Devlin).
117. See authorities cited in note 2 supra.
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nothing can expunge the sense of injustice accumulated through a
long period of denial and uncertainty. The speeding up of settlements (not merely trials) would do more to relieve the distress of
injury victims than any other conceivable change in tort law administration.
There are two possible ways to speed up settlements. One is to
speed up trials, so that judgment and execution can be obtained
within a few months by anyone who wants a trial. This ideal, which
is occupying the effort of scholars, lawyers, and judges, plays will-o'the-wisp with its pursuers. In Michigan there are twenty times as many
serious cases susceptible of trial as are being tried; there are more than
a hundred times as many cases of all degrees of seriousness as are
being tried. It is not realistic to imagine that the number of conclusions by trial can be increased enough to reduce greatly trial delay in large cities unless supplemented by radical measures.
Even if it were possible to elect enough judges, build enough
courtrooms, and draft enough jurors to cut down the trial backlog,
a part of the problem would remain uncorrected. Lawyers would still
threaten to hold out until trial as a bargaining device when they
think the nerves or resources of the opponent are unequal to their
own. Some incentive should be supplied for settling cases at reasonable amounts when reasonable estimates at a probable trial outcome
are not far apart.
If early settlements could be promoted, there would be much
more hope of reducing the backlog of cases seeking trial; in fact, this
is the only realistic hope of cutting down the trial backlog. Earlier
trials would mean speedier settlements for those who settle out of
court as well as for those who go to trial. For the latter, it also would
mean better trials, since the loss of witnesses and memories would
be greatly reduced.11 8
Some of the impediments to settlement have been clearly disclosed by recent research. One of these is the adherence by parties on
both sides to concepts of total victory. Plaintiffs demand record-making amounts; defendants make small offers, or none at all. 119 What is
needed is an increased incentive for each side to meet the other's
terms. Foreign systems of law, particularly the British, have long
known how to deal with this. They put the costs of litigation, in118. See the comment of James Marshall in The Unreality of Automobile Litigation, 50 A.B.A.J. 713, 715 (1964): "We know that there is a 'curve of forgetting' that
is scoop-shaped, like the track of a ski jump."
119. AACP 202-09.
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eluding barristers' fees, on the losing party.120 An adaptation of this
system is suggested for automobile personal injury claims in the
United States. A plaintiff should be authorized to file in court a
written demand for the settlement that he would accept. If it is not
paid within thirty days and his eventual award is larger than the offer,
the award should be augmented by litigation costs, including fees for
attorneys' services incurred after the demand was filed. The demand
should not be disclosed to the jury; the addition of costs should be
made by the judge after the jury has returned its verdict. The judge
could be given discretion to refuse to award costs in unusual
circumstances.121 The effect of this device would be to create a real
incentive to settle sooner rather than later; today, there is virtually
none. However, it would not work in cases where the plaintiff's demand is above the defendant's liability insurance limits unless
another item were added. The insurance company should be liable
for the litigation costs in addition to the policy limits.
Defendants' liability insurers are not the only source of unreasonable refusals to settle. The record of high settlements in small
loss cases and of settlements for "nuisance value" indicates that claimants and their counsel are also contributors.122 A defendant should
also be permitted to file a written offer of settlement; if it is not accepted and the eventual award is lower than the offer, the defendant's expenses after the date of the offer should be deducted from
any eventual award.
If these devices seem radical to American readers, they should
recall that liability for costs, including attorneys' fees, is a historic
and time-tested instrument of justice in the English common-law
system. 123
C. Enhancing Personal Responsibility

One of the classic justifications of the tort system is that it places
responsibility on the guilty tort-feasor; it is designed to create in
every individual an incentive to avoid harming his fellow man. m
120. AACP 434. For a collection of articles on the laws of several countries, indicating that the practice of making the unsuccessful party bear the others' costs is common
in other legal systems, see 1962 PROC. SEC. OF INT'L AND COMP. LA.w, ABA 117 (1963).
The committee report of which these articles are a part concludes with an article suggesting adoption of a similar provision in American law. Geller, Unreasonable Refusal
To Settle and Calendar Congestion-Suggested Remedy, 1962 PRoc. SEC. ON INT'L AND
CoMP. LA.w, A.B.A. 134 (1963).
121. Compare the plan proposed by Mr. Justice Geller. Ibid.
122. See generally AACP 137-58.
•
123. See Geller, supra note 120.
124. See James, Accident Liability Reconsidered, 57 YALE L.J. 549, 549 (1948).
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This is a commendable objective, but it has been largely eliminated
in automobile cases by the prevalence of liability insurance.125 Since
little thought and discussion have been given to this matter by
others, the solutions that I propose may be startling in their novelty.
They are proposed for examination and discussion, rather than for
immediate adoption.
The simplest means of increasing personal responsibility for
careful driving would be to make the cost of driving increase sharply with accident experience. The annual cost of a driver's license
could be raised as the result of involvement in an accident in the
preceding year; if there were a tax on drivers' licenses to support rehabilitation and subsistence for injury victims, this could increase
with each accident involvement, regardless of fault. Unlike tort liability, which is covered by insurance, the tax increase would be
personally felt. Moreover, it would create an incentive to avoid accidents, rather than merely to avoid a finding of negligence.
Another means of enhancing personal responsibility would be
to increase the costs of insurance for persons who appear to be bad
risks or who have unfavorable accident records. At present, although
insurance renewals are often denied to "bad risks," they can usually
become "assigned risks" with another company at a standard premium. Insurance commissioners directly or indirectly discourage companies from raising premiums for particular classes on the ground
that the increases are not "actuarially justified"-a very technical
standard. In this way, they prevent the companies from establishing
classes that would operate as safety incentives.
The insurance commissioners are doubtless justified in their present reluctance to permit rates for disfavored classes to sky-rocket; the
effect of high rates might be a lessening of insurance coverage of those
from whom the public most needs protection. But if other means
were provided for protecting injury victims-a rehabilitation plan,
a subsistence program, and a basic income maintenance system-liability insurance could more safely be left to the play of competitive
forces. There seems to be plenty of price competition among insurance companies, so that commissioner intervention is not needed to
prevent the over-all premium level from rising too high.126
125. AACP 265 table 8-5.
126. "Since competition is an adequate barrier to excessive rates, the major concern
of public control is with rate adequacy and company solvency." CRANE, AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE RATE REGULATION 133 (1962). Company solvency can be maintained in a
number of ways other than rate regulation. For examples and a discussion of their
merits, see id. at 133-44.
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A third possible means of enhancing personal responsibility
would be to limit the completeness of insurance coverage. Perhaps
all liability insurance tends to weaken personal responsibility; it is
justified in most cases because compensation of loss to the claimant
and avoidance of impoverishment of the defendant outweigh the
responsibility objective. However, there are many situations in which
the advantages of providing reparation are outweighed by the weakening of personal responsibility. It has long been declared that intentional assaults cannot be covered by liability insurance; it would
be against public policy to protect one's self against liability for intentional wrongdoing.127 For similar reasons, in all cases where recklessness is charged, the jury should be required to separate compensatory damages from punitive damages. Liability insurance should
cover only the former; there is no reason to admonish the insurance
company.128
A similar distinction might be drawn between damages for economic loss and damages for psychic loss. It must be remembered that
damages paid by insurance companies do not come only from wrongdoers; they come from all the buyers of insurance, most of whom
are quite guiltless of the accidents for which they indirectly pay.
Probably no one would seriously advocate a tax upon all drivers to
pay for the pain and suffering of the innocently injured, although at
the present time that is the effect of damage awards for pain
and suffering. Damages for pain and suffering are rationalized on the
ground that potential wrongdoers should be deterred to the extent
of the pain they will cause, as well as the economic loss. Therefore,
these damages can do their appointed work only when they are paid
from the wrongdoer's pocket; when they are coming from the rightdoers' pockets, they amount to unjust enrichment.
To correct this anomaly is simple enough. Jurors could be instructed to identify damages for pain and suffering (like punitive
damages) in a separate award, which insurance companies could be
forbidden to cover. This reform would have very little practical effect on compensation of extremely serious and fatal injuries, because
very little pain and suffering is paid for in those cases; usually not
even the economic losses are fully covered. It might have a considerable effect on the nuisance value of small loss cases, where the danger
127. See Sheehan v. Goriansky, 321 Mass. 200, 72 N.E.2d 538 (1947).
128. Cf. Note, Punitive Damages and Their Possible Application in Automobile
Accident Litigation, 46 VA. L. REv. 1036 (1960).
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of a large verdict based partly on pain and suffering frequently leads
insurance companies to settle for more than economic loss.
A fifth device for enhancing the responsibility of drivers, particularly uninsured drivers, would require a change in the law governing discharge of tort claims in bankruptcy. Ninety per cent of individual bankrupts have no assets that are liable to creditors.129
When such a person suffers a tort judgment, as he may, he escapes
scot-free. His only penalties for maiming or killing someone are his
filing fees and attorney's fees in bankruptcy. He has little incentive
to avoid accidents or even to insure; for many city-dwellers, going
through bankruptcy is no more expensive than paying an insurance
premium and is much less regular.130
There is a simple treatment for this ill. Discharge of judgments
for negligent injury should be awarded only in cases in which substantial assets are surrendered. Where the defendant has no assets, he
should pay a reasonable portion of his wages for one, two, or three
years. This could be achieved by making tort judgments dischargeable only in proceedings under chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act,
where the judge may require periodic payments for a period of up
to three years.181
Besides admonishing negligent drivers, these changes would have
a secondary beneficial effect. They would rebuild a public consciousness that damages for negligence should be assessed only because the
defendant is guilty, not merely because the plaintiff is needy. Such
reforms perhaps could not be urged if tort law continued to be the
only aid keeping an injury victim from destitution. When the recommended provisions for rehabilitation, subsistence, and wage replacement have been made, tort law can resume the function for
which it is best designed-the reparation of the innocent at the expense of the guilty.
129. Of all bankruptcies filed in fiscal year 1963, 89.5% were by non-business debtors.
TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS 5 (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 1964).
Of all bankruptcies terminated in fiscal year 1963, 62.7% had no assets and an additional 11.4% had so few assets that they did not even cover the cost of the judicial administration. Id. at 8.
130. As early as 1932, an article in the Yale Law Journal suggested an appraisal of
the function being performed by discharge in bankruptcy in light of the increasing
number of automobile tort judgments being scheduled as the sole or at least the major
liability. Douglas, Some Functional Aspects of Bankruptcy, 41 YALE L.J. 329, 343
(1932).
131. It has been suggested that a provision be made for involuntary proceedings
under chapter XIII. This would provide incentive for the debtor to forestall the creditors by a voluntary petition and periodic payments. MacLachlan, Puritanical Therapy
for Wage Earners, 68 CoM. L.J. 87, 89 (1963).
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MODES OF SANCTION

The "new prescriptions" proposed in this paper consist chiefly
of objectives to be reached; the modes of sanction require further
comment. Without detailing specific legal propositions, some general
observations will be made concerning the choice of modes by which
the desired ends can be achieved.

A. The Multiplicity of Remedies
The human mind longs for simplicity-for single formulas to
solve myriad problems. The singular mode is nowhere better illustrated than in the tort action, which purports to supply in a single
proceeding the means for meeting doctor bills, supplying subsistence, restoring earnings, equalizing property losses, assuaging suffering, deterring negligence, punishing recklessness or wrong intent,
and vindicating innocence. Although this diversity of aims is the
reason for the failure of the tort remedy, the famous Columbia
report, with incredible naivete, purported to supplant it with
another single compensation plan, which was to do all that needed
doing about automobile injuries.182 The sophisticated Connecticut
case studies, which taught a less satisfying lesson, were tucked into
an appendix. 188
As stated earlier in this article, one of the lessons of recent research, foreshadowed by the Connecticut case studies, is that a multiplicity of remedies is already at work in automobile injury casesnot only tort law, but also workmen's compensation, health insurance, life insurance, collision insurance, Old Age, Survivors' and
Disability Insurance, rehabilitation programs, and public assistance.184 Each one of these programs does some part of the job distinctly better than alternatives can do it. A sensible program for
automobile injuries would use each of these systems for the things it
can do best; for the things that none of them does well, new regimes
may have to be devised. A good program should include an extension
of rehabilitation programs, an extension of social security, and a
new program of basic income maintenance somewhat similar to
workmen's compensation. Alongside these, there should be a continuation of health insurance, life insurance, collision insurance, and
tort law without basic change except to correlate them with other
regimes.
132. THE COLUMBIA REPORT 132.
133. Id. at 218.
134. See note 98 supra.
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B. The Correlation of Regimes
The multiplicity of remedies should not be a subject of apprehension; it has the merit of reducing the seriousness of error made
in employing any one of them 'alone. The problem of correlation
;will not be immense as long as each regime has a special job that is
distinct from the others. There will be no correlation problems
among health insurance, life insurance, and subsistence provision,
because each does a different job. There are, however, important
potential overlaps between health insurance and rehabilitation;
between subsistence provisions (social security) and basic income
maintenance; between basic income maintenance and workmen's
compensation; and between nearly every regime and tort law,
which potentially covers every kind of loss.
For all these correlations there should be a simple principle of
preference. Where the benefits of two regimes are applicable, the need
should be filled by the regime which functions with least expense,
disturbance, and conflict. This is the principle that will do the most
good for injury victims and have the least burden on the motorist
or general taxpayers, who will eventually have to pay the bill in one
form or another.
This principle is just the opposite of that which the common law
has evolved. The law has proceeded on the assumption that every
loss should be shifted to the party whose fault caused it. Since the
only system for assessing fault is the tort system, the result is imposition of the greatest possible burden on the group of premium payers who eventually pick up the bill. Not only does this require administration by the most expensive system; it requires that many
losses be administered twice-first by the particular loss insurance
regime and second by the tort regime.
The proposed preference system would be best effectuated by
statutory rules for the most frequently recurring cases; but judges
could fill in the interstices by following general principles. A few
illustrations will indicate how it would work:
(1) Hospital and medical bills would be paid by ordinary health
insurance so far as possible and within policy limits; rehabilitation funds would be drawn on in qualified cases when health
insurance runs out. This is because rehabilitation is a more restrictive concept, involving more arguable distinctions than general hospital and medical care.
(2) Sick leave pay and group disability benefits paid by the
employer or his insurance company would be paid regardless
of the availability of social security and a basic income main-
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tenance plan, because the former involve the least disturbance
of the existing payment plan.
(3) Basic income maintenance should begin when employer and
employer-financed payments stop.
(4) Subsistence payments from the social security regime should
begin when employer payments or basic income maintenance
payments stop. Although social security payments are perhaps
more "efficient" than the others, the benefits would be lower
than under other systems, and it is probably cheaper to have
only one system supporting the beneficiary at one time.
(5) Payments from all these sources-health insurance, rehabilitation services, sick leave, social security, basic income maintenance-should be deductible from tort damages.
C. The Level of the Burden on Automobilists
Most legal writing, including the foregoing lines of this piece,
has assumed that motorists ought to pay the full costs of injuries
attributed to the operation of automobiles, insofar as these can be
determined. This is based either upon the price theory, which
asserts that the price of using automobiles should include the costs
of such use, or upon the incentive theory, which asserts that automobilists should be given an incentive to avoid accidents that is at
least equal to the costs of the accidents they cause.
The price theory is a corollary of the general proposition that
explains that cake should be dearer than bread because it requires
more butter, and hand-tailored clothes more expensive than machine-made ones because the former require more labor.1311 It is not
very conclusive, however, because there are many economic goods
for which society does not even attempt to charge the full costs to
the users.136 Education, police protection, and sidewalks are good
examples. Transportation has always been a hybrid case, with some
of the costs borne by users and some by the public via subsidies for
building railroads and airports and direct public expenditure for
public road-building; the bearing of part of the costs by the public
seems to be thoroughly justified by the countless indirect benefits of
transportation. Among the conspicuous contemporary benefits of the
automobile is the ability of millions of laboring people to live in
suburban communities with grass and flowers, instead of in urban
tenements.
It seems futile to argue that motorists should pay the full costs
135. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
136. For a review of theory on the social utility of compensation in relation to
reparation problems, see AACP 108-36.
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of automobile accidents. It would be more cogent to urge that automobile costs be made to include the costs of injury to the same extent as the economic units with which they compete. As means of
essential transportation, they compete chiefly with common carriers,
which probably pay more completely for the injuries they cause than
do private automobile owners. Carriers are generally financially
able to pay the entire losses, instead of escaping payment (as do uninsured automobilists) or paying only up to a modest insurance limit
(as frequently do insured automobilists).
There is another reason why the price argument is imperfectly
applicable to automobile accidents. While every cake or suit of
clothes has costs that are uniform for that kind of commodity, the
amount of losses caused by the automobile varies immensely from
driver to driver and from automobile to automobile. There is no
particular merit in putting a high price on the driving of a man who
will never cause a serious accident. Yet, virtually all the devices of
automobile injury reparation result in spreading costs over the
entire body of drivers with very little differentiation. If the entire
costs of automobile injuries were spread in the same way, it is quite
conceivable that thousands of safe drivers would be priced off the
road by the activities of relatively few dangerous ones.
If one turns from the price theory to the incentive theory, one
finds even less reason for placing all the costs of automobile injuries
on the motorists. Accidents can be avoided not only by motorists, but
also by pedestrians. They can also be diminished by building safer
highways, cutting out flashing electric signs, and moderating the sale
of liquor at roadside taverns.
Thus, it seems unsound to argue that the total costs of automobile injuries must be relentlessly spread among motorists rather than
being picked up by systems of health insurance or social security or
borne in some part by the initial victims. On the contrary, it seems
sensible to let some of the minor costs lie upon their initial victims,
to cover some costs with general health and welfare programs, to
charge some to automobilists as a class through insurance, and to
see that a few of the costs come out of the private pocketbooks of
negligent drivers.
No one has yet proposed a formula for deciding how much of
the total cost should be borne in each way. The bearing of about a
fourth of the total costs by motorists through liability insurance does
not seem prima facie excessive. But when the cost of liability insurance for a car owned by a young bachelor rises to about 350 dollars
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per year, as it does in Brooklyn, N. Y., it seems likely that the impediment to automobile ownership has risen too high.137

D. The Taxing of Automobilists
At least two, and possibly three, of the new prescriptions that I
have proposed in the preceding pages could be supported by taxes
on automobilists. These taxes might take any number of forms.
There might be a tax on new automobile sales, or on annual automobile registrations, or on the gasoline and tires consumed by automobilists, or on drivers' licenses. In fact, all of these elements are
presently taxed, and some of the existing taxes might be regarded
as motorists' contributions to the rehabilitation or subsistence fund.
But increased taxes will certainly be required, and lawmakers
should consider where they can be applied with optimum efficiency.
The most useful form of tax on new automobile sales would be
one that discriminated among types of automobiles in relation to their
tendency to produce accidents. The type of survey made by the
Cornell University Automotive Crash Injury Research could no
doubt yield statistics to show whether it is true, as some writers
charge, that sports cars, or convertibles, or super-powered cars occasion larger numbers of injuries than others.138 If so, they should
make heavier contributions to the reparation of injuries. This would
be much more sensible than taxing them according to their gross
value, which results in increasing the extra costs of seat belts, power
brakes, padded dashboards, and all other safety devices.
Another important question to determine is whether old cars
cause a disproportionate number of injuries.139 If so, a heavy tax on
new cars would have the undesired effect of increasing the costs of
replacing an old car with a new one. On the other hand, a heavy
registration tax would tend to diminish the apparent relative economy of keeping an old car. Where safety inspections are not re137. AACP 94 n.34.
138. See, e.g., KEATS, THE INSOLENT CHARIOTS 23 (1958); see generally O'Connell,
T,aming the Automobile, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 299, 334-56 (1963).
139. Studies have shown a statistical correlation between the old age and high mileage of cars and higher accident rates. E.g., Schreiber &: Schecter, Effects of Aging and
Mileage on the Accident Rates of Vehicles, in PASSENGER CAR DESIGN AND HIGHWAY
SAFETY 122, 123 (1962). States that require vehicles to pass periodic inspection have consistently lower death rates than those that do not require such inspection. Lowery,
Vehicle Condition and Periodic Safety Inspections, in id. at 109, ll0.
O'Connell suggests that many old cars are driven by young drivers and calls the
combination of the most dangerous cars and the most dangerous drivers "potentially
disastrous." O'Connell, supra note 138.
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quired, tax reductions could be awarded to older cars that pass an
inspection of their brakes, tires, lights, doors, and seat belts.
An important potential source of revenue, virtually untapped, is
the driver's license. For the most part, these have been issued at a
minimum price. It might be a very wholesome thing to make a
driver's license at least as expensive as an automobile license. It
would also be useful to have different fees for different classes of
drivers. It is much more appropriate to raise the drivers' license fees
of young men than to raise the cost of the insurance bought by the
young men's fathers.
E. The Federal-State Puzzle
No sensitive American can escape a twinge of nostalgia as he
sees an area of law, once sacred to the delightful localism of state
law, succumb to the necessities of federalism. But the automobile is
the most literal example of a subject on which state particularism
belongs to the horse and buggy days.
The objectives of any plan to improve automobile accident reparation are to eliminate impoverishments that result from them and to
spread the costs equitably among those who cause them. Any program that seeks to alleviate these evils on a statewide basis is boxing
with shadows. States like California and Michigan are tourist meccas,
seasonally inundated with out-of-state automobiles and drivers.
States like Illinois and New York are crossroads for traffic that neither
originates nor terminates within the state. These states may impose
heavy burdens on their own motorists in order to protect their citizens from serious loss, only to have them exposed to the less regulated
drivers of other states. One is tempted to advocate that every state
border should have, as in Europe, a police check of insurance certificates; but on one wants to put that kind of a burden on the interstate
flow of traffic.
Any program for the aid of automobile injury victims will be
more effective if built on a federal base. The rehabilitation program,
the subsistence program, and the wage replacement program would
be most effective if national in scope. This proposal does not exclude administration by state agencies under national norms, just as
existing rehabilitation programs and unemployment insurance are
conducted.
There is no need to impose corresponding federal uniformity on
tort law. Here there is still room for Cardozo's "state laboratory"
concept. But federal law should impose a uniform federal rule for
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the deductibility of benefits from the federally imposed programs, in
order to prevent a perversion of the programs by the inertia or confusion of state legislatures.
VI.

~

SUMMARY

Recent empirical research makes possible new and fresh approaches to the problem of economic reparation for automobile injuries. As a lawyer who has been engaged in some of the research
and who has given some thought to its implications, I present the
following as some of my personal conclusions:

I. The way ahead is not through a single plan for automobile
injuries; it is through keeping alive the plurality of existing programs-from social security to tort damages-with some extensions,
additions, and correlations.
2. One urgent need that should be filled immediately is the adoption of a program that would provide rehabilitation, from surgery
to vocational retraining, for every automobile injury victim, regardless of the circumstances of his injury.
3. A second urgent need is an extension of subsistence through
the social security system to automobile injury victims and dependents of victims who are not now "fully covered" because they have
not spent enough time in "covered employment."
4. A third desideratum-although less urgent than the preceding ones-is a program of basic income maintenance for wage earners; this would not apply to non-wage-earners.
5. Tort actions would continue, but damage rules should be revised to deduct from recoverable damages the amounts that injury
victims have recovered or can recover from health insurance, rehabilitation programs, social security, and disability insurance.
6. Measures should be taken to enhance the personal responsibility of tort-feasors. Suggested for consideration are exclusion of punitive damages and psychic damages from insurance coverage; denial
of unconditional bankruptcy discharges for personal injury judgments; permitting insurance companies to set up safety incentive
rates without regard to "actuarial justification."
7. Incentives to make and accept reasonable settlement offers
shoul!l be increased by assessing the opponents' full costs of litigation on the party who rejects a reasonable settlement offer.
8. The classic "automobile injury compensation plan" and the
more recent compulsory liability insurance laws are decidedly inferior to other practicable treatments of the reparation problem.

